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RHETORICAL PLURALISM AND THE
DISCOURSE IDEAL: COUNTERING
DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT V
SMITH, A PARABLE OF PAGANS,
POLITICS, AND MAJORITARIAN RULE*
Richard K Sherwin**
. . . to secure these rights [of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness]
governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed, That whenever any Form of government becomes
destructive of these ends it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it,
and to institute a new Government, laying its foundation on such principles
and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their Safety and Happiness.
(Thomas Jefferson')
If our sense of duty forbids [allowing slavery to spread], then let us stand by
our duty, fearlessly and effectively. Let us be diverted by none of those
sophistical contrivances... such as groping for some middle ground between the right and the wrong .... Let us have faith that right makes
might, and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare to do our duty as we understand it.
(Abraham Lincoln 2)
Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an
inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny.
Whatever affects one directly affects all indirectly.
(Martin Luther King3)
* Copyright 1991 by Richard K. Sherwin.
** Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School. I wish to thank Bruce Ackerman, Neal

Feigenson, Alon Hare], David Schoenbrod, Michael Sinclair and Mark Tushnet for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this work. I also wish to acknowledge the excellent research assistance
of Stephen Peduto, class of 1991. This Article is dedicated, in the spirit of hope, to my son David.
1 The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
2 A. LINCOLN, From an Address at Cooper Institute, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN'S SPEECHES AND

LET-ERS 1832-1865, at 136 (1957).
3 King, Letterfrom Birmingham City Jail,in A TESTAMENT OF HOPE 290 (J. Washington ed.
1986).
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In the end, the only guarantee of human dignity is that we would, if pressed
too far, be prepared to rebel, and, if we did so, would have right on our side.
It would then be the duty of other members of our community to support
US.

(Tony Honore4)
If we are creating a permanent underclass in this country, we will sow the
wind and reap the whirlwind.

I.

(Alistair M. Hanna5)
INTRODUCTION

The chief task of democratic government is to mediate, in a world of
discord, violence, and death, the insistent demands of liberty, community, and social justice. 6 The failure to accommodate any one of these
demands can be fatal to the continued legitimacy of the political and
legal system. Self or group identity is precarious if unprotected by legal
rights; rights without an identity to protect are practically meaningless;
and rights and identity taken together will become irrelevant if they can-

not prevent sigificant economic, social, or political exclusion from the
conventional practices of public life. Without adequate public guarantees securing legal rights, self or group identity, and social justice, the

individual may lack sufficient reason to submit to the rule of law. Domination and the exercise of naked power are the natural offspring of unac-

ceptable, and thus illegitimate, state action.
Today such a profound legitimation crisis lies before us. Liberal val4 Honore, The Right to Rebel, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 34, 54 (1988).
5 N.Y. Times, Apr. 8, 1990, § 4, at 6.
6 The demands of liberty include the pursuit of private interest and the right to speak and think
as one pleases; the demands of community include the need (and perhaps the duty) to cultivate and
maintain norms of group identity; the demands of social justice include the obligation to avoid the
creation of a perpetually alienated, or politically or economically disempowered out-class in society.
Private property interests and individual autonomy within a free market system have been the traditional focus of the libertarian strain within classic liberal theory. See, eg., J. LocKE, Two TREATISES ON GOvERNMENT (1690); R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974). The
communitarian critique of the libertarian view reflects a broader understanding of self and group
identity and envisions a more expansive role for the state than the libertarian view allows. See, eg.,
J. RoUSsEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1762); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JusTiCE (1982). Concern with inequalities of resource distribution, political empowerment and economic opportunity provide yet another ground for criticizing the libertarian's view of the
autonomous individual and the minimal state. See, eg., R. HILDRETH, DESPOTISM IN AMERICA
(1840); Dworkin, What is Equality?Part3: The Place ofLiberty, 73 IowA L. REv. 1 (1987); Dworkin, What is Equality?Part 4: PoliticalEquality, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 1 (1987). The challenge modem
liberals face is to syncretize these disparate views into a unified and relatively stable political and
legal system. See A. WOLFE, WHOSE KEEPER? 10 (1989):
Liberal democracies face discontents because they tend to rely on either individualistic moral
codes associated with the market or collective moral codes associated with the state, yet neither
set of codes can successfully address all the issues that confront society.... Neither [the market
nor the state] puts its emphasis on the bonds that tie people together because they want to be
tied together without regard for their immediate self-interest or for some external society having
the power to enforce those ties.
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ues are being challenged on many fronts-from post-modem deconstruc7
tionists on the one side, to pre-modern fundamentalists on the other.
Yet, it is not with the scholars where the greatest danger lies. It is in the
public arena itself. So long as fear and uncertainty continue to becloud
our national sense of identity and direction and to distort the discrete
functions of government-a state of affairs that this Article claims currently exists within our polity-the future of liberalism in America will
remain seriously troubled.
The liberal formula for success in the task of government combines
tolerance and respect for difference (viz., the autonomy and dignity of the
individual) with a lively and broad acceptance of, and commitment to,
shared fundamental ideals. 8 The story that liberalism can tell provides us
with acceptable answers to the most fundamental questions of American
life: What is the basis for our union? What is it we have a right to expect
of government? And when does government act in violation of our
rights?
Without widespread agreement on, and commitment to, the basic
values to which these questions point, the authority of law and the order
of our political and legal institutions cannot be securely maintained. To
the extent that we fail to forge consensus on these matters, we face the
prospect of an increasing resistance to the state's authority together with
the violence and disorder that such resistance often entails.
The challenge, therefore, is not to seek order for its own sake 9although a threat of social disorder will tempt many toward this "solution." 10 Rather, it is a struggle for shared beliefs regarding the basic
values that animate and constrain life in the public sphere. In short, we
must rediscover the pulse of our higher law. And if officials-in legislatures and courtrooms across the land-mistake or deny that pulse, a
committed citizenry will be forced to tiake its measure in their own
sphere of action.
It is against this backdrop that I examine the perspective of rhetorical pluralism and the discourse ideal. This approach suggests at least one
way in which we may begin to restore institutional order while also
inspiring revitalized acceptance of, and commitment to, basic liberal ideals. The roots of rhetorical pluralism and the discourse ideal in the
American legal culture can be traced to the "law as process" movement
7 See Sherwin, Law, Violence and IlliberalBelief, 78 GEO. L.J. 1785 (1990).
8 See Macedo, The Politics of Justification, 18 POL. THEORY, 280 (1990); Waldron, Theoretical
Foundationsof Liberalism, 37 PHIL. Q. 127, 149 (1987).
9 See, eg., F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 80 (1944) ("It may even be said that for the
Rule of Law to be effective it is more important that there should be a rule applied always without
exceptions than what this rule is.").
10 See, eg., Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "Drug Exception" to the Bill of Rights, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 889 (1987).
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initiated by Hart and Sacks,' 1 the "dialogic liberalism" of Bruce Ackerman, 12 the "constitutive rhetoric" of James Boyd White, 13 and to Robert
Cover's penetrating insights regarding the self and law constituting
("jurisgenerative") function of community and the unavoidable interplay
4
between the law's narratives and violence.'
Specifically, I argue that the liberal formula for success in government requires a broad and active commitment not only to institutional
competencies (which I describe in this Article under the rubric of rhetorical pluralism) and substantive constitutional norms (which primarily describe the realm of individual rights). Success also requires a broad and
active commitment to maintain the cultural, political, and economic conditions necessary for the individual's acceptance of the state's power.

A major goal of this Article is to encourage increased critical reflection upon the dangers of continuing along the jurisprudential and sociopolitical track that we are currently on.15 Above all, my hope is for an

end to the politics of fear and a repudiation of strategies that seek unity

through enmity.1 6 In the end, we will pay for such practices in the cur-

l1 See H. HART & A. SACKS, The Legal Process Basic Problems in the Making and Application
of Law iii (tent. ed. 1958):
These materials are concerned with the study of law as an ongoing, functioning, purposive
process and, in particular, with the study of the various institutions, both official and private,
through which the process is carried on.... The solution of specific legal problems constantly
requires an understanding of the functions and interrelationships of more than one institutional
process and frequently of several. Problems arising in a court call for a perceptive awareness
not only of what courts are for but of what a legislature is for and sometimes also of what an
administrative agency is for and of what matters can best be left to private decision. Problems
arising in the course of the legislative or administrative processes call for the same awarenesses.
Professor Anthony A. Amsterdam is currently the leading analyst and educator along these lines.
See also C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTrIUTIONAL LAW (1969).

12 See B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE LIBERAL STATE 357-59 (1980); Ackerman,
Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5, 8 (1989).
13 See J.WHITE, HERACLES' Bow (1985); J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING

(1984).
14 See Cover, The Bonds of ConstitutionalInterpretation:Of the Word, the Deed and the Role, 20
GA. L. REv. 815 (1986) [hereinafter Bonds]; Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1983) [hereinafter Nomos].
15 The role of subjective ideology and management efficiency in the Supreme Court's recent
decisionmaking has been a source of concern to an increasing number of scholars. See, eg.,
Arenella, Rethinking the Functionsof CriminalProcedure"The Warren andBurger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185 (1983); Chang, DiscriminatoryImpact,Affirmative Action andInnocent Victims: Judicial Conservatism or Conservative Justice?, 91 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming
1991). The growing emiseration of the poor, especially poor blacks, also has not gone without notice. See, eg., Delgado, Zero-Based RacialPolitics: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case Arguments on
Behalf of the Nonwhite Underclass, 78 GEo. L.J. 1929, 1930 (1990) ("Every index of black and
brown emiseration today warrants alarm. Measures of blacks' income, net wealth, educational attainment, life expectancy, infant mortality, rates of serious illness, drug addiction, and incarceration
are worse than those of whites. On most of these measures, the black-white gap is increasing, and on
some, blacks stand worse off today than they did ten or even twenty years ago."); Luban, The Court
and Dr. King, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2152, 2161 nn. 21-22 (1989).
16 See, eg., F. KNIGHT, FREEDOM AND REFORM 370 (1947) ("Antagonism, war, and preparation for war between nations and allied groups can be viewed as the one psychological force capable
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rency of our most cherished values.
Section II of this Article outlines the theory and practice of rhetorical pluralism and the discourse ideal. My contention here is that this
approach offers a persuasive response both to illiberal critics, who would
turn away from our liberal heritage altogether, and to liberal critics who,
by pulling a single strand from the cloth of liberalism, risk leaving the
whole in tatters. I maintain that neither a theory of interpretation, 17 normative deference to legislative deliberation1 8 or judicial prophecy, 19 the
revival of civic republicanism, 20 or the privatization of power through
the proliferation of multiple local communities21 will alone do justice to
the complex vision that shapes and informs our constitutional democracy. That constitutional vision, I contend, embraces not just one type of
knowledge and discourse (about law and power), but several. And its
pragmatic institutionalization of discrete ways of thinking and speaking
provides discursive guidelines not only for intra-institutional competencies, but also for our inter-institutional system of checks and balances.
Having set out in Section II criteria for intra-institutional competencies and inter-institutional checks and balances, Section III provides a
specific case study in which these standards can be concretely applied. In
of overcoming tendencies to conflict between interest groups within nations, groups formed chiefly
along economic lines."); J.ROCHE, THE QUEST FOR THE DREAM (1963) (recounting the recurrent
patterns of intolerance, nativism, religious prejudice, and racism that have stained our history);
Brinkley, Old Glory: The Sage of a NationalLove Affair N.Y. Times, July 1, 1990, § 4, at 2, col. 1
(noting that "the salience of the flag issue in 1989 and 1990 [ie., efforts to amend the first amendment in order to constitutionalize the prohibition of flag burning] suggests other anxieties... similar
to the anti-radical and nativist concerns that fueled earlier flag protection efforts.").
The country's obsession with drug control may be playing a significant role in this context, for it
has been generating potent pressures against basic constitutional (higher law) values. See, eg., Hansen, When Worlds Collide: The ConstitutionalPoliticsof United States v. Salerno, 14 AM. 3. CRIM.
L. 155, 167 (1988); Sullivan, "User-Accountability" Provisionsin the Anti-DrugAct of 1988: Assaulting Civil Liberties in the War on Drugs, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1223 (1989); Wisotsky, supra note 10. The
civil liberty implications of the drug war have not been lost on more popular commentators. See, e.g.,
Wenner, Drug War: A New Vietnam?, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1990, § 1, at 23, col. 2; Treaster, Is the
Fight On Drugs Eroding Civil Rights?, N.Y. Times, May 6, 1990, § 4, at 5, col. 4; Rosenthal, The
Drug Train, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1989, at A31, col. 1. Nevertheless, the perception of political gain in
increased penalties for drug offenders seems to remain strong. See, eg., Shenon, Administration Offers a Tough New DrugBill, N.Y. Times, May 17, 1990, at A21, col. I (describing Bush Administration's proposal, inter alia, to expand the list of drug crimes that could be punished by death and

streamline procedures for deporting aliens convicted of drug crimes). In an effort to make the anticrime bill more widely acceptable, House and Senate negotiators subsequently removed death penalty provisions and curbs on semiautomatic rifles. Liberals had generally opposed the former, and
conservatives the latter. See Congress Acts on Bills Embracing Several Major Issues, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 28, 1990, at 27, col. 3.
17 See, e.g., R. DwoRKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45-86 (1986).
18 See, eg., Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29 (1985).
19 See, eg., M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 98-101 (1982).
20 See, e.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword:Traces of Self-Government,
100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986).
21 See, e.g., Cover, Nomos, supra note 14.
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this Section, I maintain that the Supreme Court's decision in Division of
Employment v. Smith22 -where the Court refused to exempt the plaintiff's religious use of peyote from criminalization by the state even if this
meant depriving the Native American Church of its chief sacramentreflects, and allows us to consider the effects of, the prevailing jurisprudence of deference to legislative/majoritarian interest accommodation
and management efficiency. I contend that the majority's disregard for
its interpretive obligations regarding higher constitutional law and for
the Court's singular competency in principled discourse, reinforces the
politics of fear and uncertainty that is coming to dominate public life. In
this way, political bargaining increasingly displaces the unique virtues of
principled judicial review. The net result in Smith is to allow popular
prejudices, misunderstanding, or indifference to lawfully disembody a
sincerely held, albeit pagan, belief system.
This Article maintains that profound distortions in the discursive
practices of the judicial and legislative communities 23 are creating a
deep-seated and complex crisis regarding the legitimacy of governmental
authority. The need openly to confront and resolve this crisis requires an
ongoing self-reflective critique of discrete institutional defects, and renewed affirmation of each institution's characteristic competencies. Absent corrective steps within those institutions, the burden will fall upon a
mobilized citizenry to normalize errant governmental operations.
Whether mass mobilization and struggle will advance this normalization
process on the basis of a renewed value consensus, 24 or will instead produce even greater institutional dysfunctions, thus becomes one of the key
25
political and legal questions of our time.
II. RHETORICAL PLURALISM AND THE DISCOURSE IDEAL
A. Introduction
I begin with the paradigm of indictment-society's way of calling
the other into question. 26 The indictment sets in motion a force that
22 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990).
23 Cf. A. MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE

(1984) (on the correlation between discourse/knowledge
types and the creation and maintenance of discrete communities); S. TOULMIN, HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (1972).
24 See, eg., J. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SociETY 86-90 (1979)
(on ego development and the development of moral consciousness).
25 Success or failure will depend upon those who lead the debate and the terms that they provide
for it.
26 See M. HEIDEGGER, NIETZSCHE VOLUME IV: NIHiLisM 36-37 (1982):
A kategoria is a word in which a thing is 'indicted' as what it is ... Kategoriaand kategorein

arise from kata and agoreuein. Agora means a public gathering of people as opposed to a closed
council meeting, the openness of deliberations of court proceedings, of the market, and of communication. Agoreuein means to speak openly, to announce something openly to the public, to
make a revelation.... This kind of addressing and setting forth, of making public in words, is
most emphatically present when charges are proferred against someone in open court proceed-
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flows two ways at once. It activates values by which we judge the accused and ourselves in the selfsame act. For as common wisdom says, we
often discover who we are in our condemnation (or acquittal) of someone
else. Here, in the realm of public indictment, is where the law's power
and normative authority converge. 27 I speak, therefore, of violence and
the word. The ultimate instruments of law are war and poetry.
Legitimation "civilizes" violence through public consensus on basic
principles of government and institutional processes of law making, law
interpretation and law enforcement. 28 In this view, legitimation can
neither be stabilized solely by formal definitions of rules29 or by universal
claims of right.3 0 Rather, it operates dynamically. The shared values
that legitimate governmental authority depend upon shifting tolerances
31
and beliefs within society.
Those who participate in the affairs of the state-whether as elected
or appointed official or as ordinary citizen-are saying "yes," by their
participation, to the state and its power. 32 They may argue with this or
that governmental action, but like Socrates in the Crito, their dissent is a
part of the participatory process. Dissent is a "no" writ small against the
ings, stating that he is guilty of something or other. Addressing and setting forth has its most
striking and therefore most common form in such open charges.
27 See Cover, Bonds, supra note 14.
28 The absence of either fair process or shared fundamental principles may suffice to unravel the
legitimacy of the political and legal system. Conversely, it is difficult to conceive of securing legitimation unless it is rooted in both procedural and substantive justice.
29 See H.L.A. HART, A CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
30 See B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 188 (1982)

("The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or musty
records. They are written, as with a sunbeam, in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of
divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power.") (quoting Hamilton).
31 Throughout our history individuals and communities have tested within the public square, in
both word and deed, their respective strengths-including the strength of their most cherished beliefs. At the birth of our nation Americans resisted with violence the colonial oppressor; in the war
among the states, Americans fought over a union that could not continue half slave and half free;
during the civil rights and anti-war protests of the 1950s and 1960s, Americans demonstrated with
non-violence, and at times with violence, the unacceptability of certain domestic and foreign policies.
In more recent times, Americans have expressed "pro-life" beliefs with bombs and acts of civil disobedience against abortion clinics; they have expressed "anti-war" beliefs with hammers and blood
against nuclear warheads; and they have expressed "deep ecology" beliefs with acts of sabotage
against loggers and mill workers.
For each of us there is a community of belief, and most often more than one. The community is
ours because we claim it, or it claims us-perhaps because others claim it for us (because of our race,
or religion or gender or sexual preference). See B. ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES 136 (1983)
("Niggers are, thanks to the invisible tar brush forever Niggers; Jews, the seed of Abraham, forever
Jews, no matter what language they speak and read. [Thus for the Nazi, the Jewish German was
always an impostor.]"). Whether acts of public protest prompt patriotic cries of "Love it or leave
it," or are prompted in turn by love itself, may depend upon the group (or groups) to which we owe
allegiance. See M. KING, A TESTAMENT OF HOPE 82 (1986) ("The greatest instrument [of resistance] is the instrument of love.").
32 See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 812 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (referring to the
"equal participation in civic life that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.").
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backdrop of a "yes" writ large. Rebellion (or secession), by politics or by
criminality, is a "no" writ large. It challenges the state's power and its
right to make and enforce norms.
So we may well ask: Why say "yes" to the state's power? Am I to
defer to a reasoning I cannot understand (but which I accept because I
accept the process of lawmaking and law enforcement that spawned it)?
Am I to disobey official policy because power belongs to the People? Or,
at least, to my People, to my church, to my community? Am I to be
ruled by your word, your community, your church?
For its part, the state cannot avoid exercising its power-if its norms
are to be upheld. Domestically, we sanction, detain, imprison, and kill.
We say "no" to the negators, the social "deviants" who have placed
themselves "above the law." They are outsiders, enemies of the state.
Even deviants in speech only may be penalized, if what they say overleaps
the bounds of acceptability: the pornographer,3 3 the fomenters of vio35
lence,3 4 the defamers of character.
Perhaps, then, we may agree: law talk involves us in no ordinary

conversation. Its violence sets it apart from other kinds of speech. But if
we accept the force of the law's word, what are we to make of its other
aspect, which I have referred to as the law's poetry? What is the "poetics"
36
of the law?
Here we arrive at the heart of my theme, the stories of the law:
stories of vision; stories of freedom and of freedom's obligations; stories
33 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) ("Obscene material is unprotected by the
First Amendment."). Consider the more recent controversies surrounding Robert Mapplethorpe's
photography and the recordings of the rap group, 2 Live Crew.
34 See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The most stringent protection of
free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does
not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of
force.").
35 See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-10 (1940) ("Resort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by the
Constitution, and its punishment as a criminal act would raise no question under that instrument.").
But see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) ("We hold today that the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials
against critics of their official conduct.").
36 "Poetics" in this context carries the meaning ofmythos or plot: it describes the arrangement of
the incidents or the organization of the events. See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC AND POETics 232 (Modem Library 1954) ("[Ihe first essential, the life and soul, so to speak, of Tragedy is the Plot."); F.
HALLYN, THE POETIC STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD 14 (1990). Like a new hypothesis in science,
before it is sufficiently validated and accepted, the mythos serves as a heuristic fiction. Id. at 13. In
Hallyn's more expanded sense, a study of poetics
is the program for the execution of a work, informed by presuppositions and exigencies whose
traces one can locate, on the one hand, in explicit declarations, and on the other, in the work
itself, to the extent that its completed form, with respect to other works, gives witness to the
intentions that presided over its production.
Id. at 14-15.
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of community, and of a community of communities; stories of equality
and of social justice.
Lawyers, judges, and legal scholars differ on how to tell the stories
of the law.37 Some talk about substantive rights and prophecies,3 8 some

talk about fair process and the necessary inclusion of minorities in the
channels of power,3 9 some talk about common sense,40 some talk about
41
costs and benefits and maximizing utility.
Today, jurists are in disarray over how to tell stories of legitimation.
Liberal theory is under attack as never before: from pre-modernist fundamentalists who protest against the putative emptiness of liberal morality;
from civic republicans who seek release in public life from the isolation of
liberal atomism; from anarchists who reject the state for its lack of selfjustification; from post-modem critics who look around only to find contradiction and unspoken ideology at every turn.4 2
I believe the liberal vision has the strength and vitality to counter or
absorb these critics' claims. But to do so, its basic ideals and institutional
requirements must be persuasively set out. It is against this backdrop of
discord and disarray that I shall proceed to poeticize.
37 Indeed, opinions differ not only on the kinds of stories about law and power that count in
society---Le., the ones that are backed by force. They also differ on who should get to tell the story in
the first place: We the People? See, e.g., Ackerman, The Storrs Lecture" Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984). The Legislature? See, eg., Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REv. 29, 37, 41 (1985). The Courts? See, eg., Michelman, The Supreme
Court, 1985 Term-Foreward:Traces ofSelf-Government, 100 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1986). Or perhaps
the Executive? See, eg., C. SUNsTiN, INTERPRETING THE REGULATORY STATE (1990); Rehn-

quist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693, 704 (1976). These are no mere
formalities. Choosing the discourse of power helps determine not only who gets to speak, and how,
but also how power gets distributed in society. See Diver, Statutory Interpretationin the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549 (1985); Mashaw, Prodelegation Why AdministratorsShould Make
PoliticalDecisions, 1 J. LAW, ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985). See generally, Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of RhetoricalFields in the Law of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 729 (1988) [hereinafter Dialects].
38 See, e.g., R. DwoRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 82 (1978) (arguing in behalf of the fundamental right of all to "equal respect and concern"); M. PERRY, supra note 19, at 98 (referring to
judicial review as the "institutionalization of prophecy").
39 See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
40 See, e.g., J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 13, at 192 (arguing
that the "ordinary-language practice of blaming" is the chief means by which to make sense of the
criminal law). But see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968) (holding that there are
some intellectual functions which the lay jury simply cannot be expected to undertake, and others of
which they are singularly capable); Jackson v. Dunno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
41 See, eg., Sulie v. Duckworth, 689 F.2d 128, 130-31 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (arguing that
an appropriate measure for whether a constitutional right has been violated can be found in assessing
whether the government's use of that right against the defendant would be sufficient to prevent the
defendant from relying on it); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). See generally Kahn, The Court, the Community and the JudicialBalance: The JurisprudenceofJusticePowell,
97 YALE L.J. 1 (1987) (critiquing Justice Powell's "representative balancing" approach to
jurisprudence).
42 See generally Sherwin, supra note 7.
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There is a story of legitimation that I would like to tell. It is the
story of rhetorical pluralism and the discourse ideal.
Rhetorical pluralism provides an account of structural constitutional norms which institutionalize a pluralist vision of human nature by
creating separate roles in the public sphere for discrete forms of knowledge and discourse. These forms include the citizen's ordinary common
sense about truth and justice, the legislator's deliberative and instrumental policymaking in the political bargaining process, and the judge's principled decisionmaking through the contextual application of text-based,
inherited norms. Each of these discrete forms has its own particular
community and its own characteristic virtues and defects. The virtues
guide and inform each community's discursive competence in the public
sphere. They are also necessary to check and balance the discrete defects
of each community.
As a result of this checking and balancing process, no single community can impose with finality upon another its own way of speaking
and thinking. At the same time, no single community is "deviant" with
regard to another. 43 Awareness of the defects and unique advantages of
each community induces a sense of mutual need and respect. For their
part, like rhetorical (or structural constitutional) norms, substantive constitutional norms also delineate the powers and limits of the state. They
do this by describing shared basic values which operate primarily in the
sphere of individual rights. These values include the right to equal respect and political empowerment.
Broad and active commitment to structural and substantive constitutional norms is necessary to ensure the legitimation of the state's
power. But, standing alone, this commitment is not enough. Legitimation also depends upon the socio-political conditions required for knowing and voluntary submission to the rule of law. I contend that the extralegal norms of socio-political legitimation are to be found in the ideal of
discourse. This ideal describes the conditions necessary to sustain the
living reality of discourse itself-namely, respect for the other; a willingness to listen to (and empathize with) the story she has to tell; and a
commitment, within the framework established by mutually acceptable
structural and substantive legal norms, to keep alive the process of give
and take.44 Each member of the polity must have a real stake in this
43 Contrast A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962) and Minersville School
Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 599 (1940) (Frankfurter, J.):

Except where the transgression of constitutional liberty is too plain for argument, personal
freedom is best maintained-so long as the remedial channels of the democratic process remain
open and unobstructed-when it is ingrained in a people's habits and not enforced against popular policy by the coercion of adjudicated law.
overruled in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
44 This emphasis upon discursive exchange is consistent with the current cultural turn away

from philosophical "metaphysics" (Le., the possibility of discovering some universal truth or transcultural or transcendental notion of validity). See, eg., Rorty, Truth and Freedom: A Reply to
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process. Each must realize that her liberty is inextricably tied to the liberty of others. 45 And each must be assured that his or her participation
will not cause her sense of self or group identity to unravel. 46 In short, if
the demands of liberty, community, and social justice are not successfully
mediated, no shared public community can come into being-much less
flourish in the world of discord, violence, and death that we all must
face. 47 Rhetorical pluralism and the discourse ideal suggests a way to
make this mediation work both in theory and in practice.
Thomas McCarthy, 16 CRmICAL INQUIRY 633, 638 (1990). In this sense, the philosophical search
for certainty (based on "self-evident" or "apodictic" truth) needs to give way to the more open and
tolerant discursive practice of persuasive argumentation. See id. at 634. This takes us into the proper
domain of "high rhetoric" (Le., not the disparaged sense of Enlightenment thinkers, following
Descartes, whose search for certainty inspired repudiation of mere claims to argumentative persuasiveness). High rhetoric comports with Aristotle's and, more recently, Perelman's sense of arguing
from probabilities rather than certainties. According to this view, reasoning from self-evident axioms is inappropriate to a proper understanding of human actions. See, eg., AusroTLE, supra note
36, at 19-24; C. PERELMAN, THE REALM OF RHETORIC 1-8 (1982); McKeon, Dialogue and Controversy In Philosophy, 17 PHIL. AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 143 (1956).
In the political sphere, if the metaphysical urge for certainty opens out to religious or ideological intolerance (whether in the Spanish Inquisition or the Stalinist gulag), commitment to persuasive
argumentation fuels liberal tolerance and discursive exchange. According to this analysis, the dominant rhetorical style of the humanist Renaissance has more to do with the flourishing of liberalism
than with the rhetoric that characterized Luther's apodictic break with the authority of the Church.
See M. BOYLE, RHETORIC AND REFORM 113 (1983) ("As [Luther] declared to Erasmus, 'Truth and
doctrine always, openly, and firmly are to be preached, and never uttered obliquely or concealed, for
there is nothing scandalous in it.' "); cf. Ackerman, Robert Bork's GrandInquisition, 99 YALE L.J.
1419 (1990) (on Bork's ideological conversion and subsequent inquisitorial search for heresy within
the legal culture).
As I hope to make clear in this Article, however, I do not mean to embrace without exception
Rorty's brand of liberalism. For example, in my view his insistence on the adequacy of freedom
alone, as a basis for our "social glue," is insufficient: it cannot ensure the legal and political demands
of social justice. Compare Rorty, supra, at 635 ("My own hunch, or at least hope, is that our culture
is gradually coming to be structured around the idea of freedom-of leaving people alone to dream
and think and live as they please, so long as they do not hurt other people-and that this idea
provides as viscous a social glue as that of unconditional validity.") and R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY,
IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY 82-88 (1989) ("The social glue holding together the ideal liberal society
... consists in little more than a consensus that the point of social organization is to let everybody
have a chance at self-creation to the best of his or her abilities, and that that goal requires, besides
peace and wealth, the standard 'bourgeois freedoms.' ") with McCarthy, Ironist Theory as a Vocation: A Response to Rorty's Reply, 16 CRrICAL INQUIRY 644, 648 (1990) ("[Rorty] nowhere provides a satisfactory analysis of free encounters or political freedom, for the simple reason that his
account of freedom moves almost exclusively at the level of the isolated individual and scarcely
thematizes structures of intersubjectivity or institutional arrangements.").
45 See Habermas, Morality and Ethical Life- Does Hegel's Critique of Kant Apply to Discourse
Ethics?, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 38, 49 (1989) ("In discourse ethics, the idea of autonomy is intersubjective. It takes into account the fact that the free actualization of the personality of one individual
depends on the actualization of freedom for all."); see also King, supra note 3.
46 See M. SANDEL, supra note 6, at 57-59.
47 See Sherwin, supranote 7 (arguing that the creation of more private worlds-Cover's response
to the contemporary lack of a common community--cannot help solve the legitimation problems of
government).
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Let the account begin with reference to the three matters about

which a liberal theory of legitimation must present an acceptable understanding: (1) human nature; (2) the institutionalizationofpower; and (3)
48
shared normative ideals.
In what follows, I shall argue that the theory and practice of rhetorical pluralism in combination with the animating and constraining ideal

of discourse, provide a persuasive and integrated account for all three of
these matters. I can only indicate in broad outline here why I believe this

to be the case. My hope is that even this sketch will suffice to prompt
increased debate and move discussion further along rhetorical lines.4 9
B. Rhetorical Pluralismand Accounts of Human Nature

In the realms of law and politics, conceptions of human nature often
reflect diverse, historically rooted understandings of what it takes for

people to accept the power of the state. Consider, for example, the
wholly external sanctionsof absolute power which Hobbes deemed necessary in order to constrain man's unruly passions and appetites. 50 Or the
wholly internalized sanctions of the general will authorized by Rousseau's moral vision of natural man.5 1 Or consider the rationalnormative

choices that emerge from beneath the veil of ignorance that Rawls imagi48 Political philosophers, whether consciously or not, have endorsed particular understandings
of what humans are like and what we can expact of them in the public sphere. This becomes particularly significant when issues of power are at stake. How power gets distributed in society-who gets
to say what about what issues and with what effect--closely tracks the type of individual that a
particular thinker either (descriptively) accepts or (normatively) privileges. See ARISTOTLE, POLlTICS, Chapter IV (S. Everson ed. 1988) (correlating different types of "good citizens" with different
types of constitutions); T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (E. Rhys rev. ed. 1914) (1st ed. 1651) (on human
egoism and the need for the absolute sovereign in order to control human rapaciousness and aggression); R. NozICK, supra note 6, at 18-19 (extolling Adam Smith on the basis that "every individual
intends only his own interest" and is led "by an invisible hand" to promote an end that lies beyond
his own intention); PLATO, REPUBLIC III, lines 413-15 (R. Sterling & W. Scott eds. 1985) (linking
the ideal republic to the creation and maintenance of distinct social classes--rulers, warriors, and
traders--each reflecting a particular type of soul); J. ROUSSEAU, EMILE (A. Bloom ed. 1979) (on
moral virtues and the ability to order one's life with regard to others, not simply oneself alone); M.
SANDEL, supranote 6 (criticizing John Rawls's A Theory ofJustice on the ground that "what issues
at one end in a theory of justice must issue at the other in a theory of the person," and that Rawl's
theory of justice incorrectly requires that the person be an abstract agent of community or historyin short, a person deprived of meaningful identity).
49 For a fuller treatment of the rhetorical perspective as applied to law, see Sherwin, supranotes
7 and 37; see also C. PERELMAN, supra note 44; Burke, Politicsas Rhetoric, 93 ETHICS, 45-55 (1982)
(setting forth a "rhetorical" conception of politics); Rooney, Politicsof Pluralism, 12 CRITICAL INQUIRY 550, 561 (1986) ("Persuasion is the central, though largely unarticulated category of critical
pluralism.").
50 See T. HOBBES, supra note 48, at 74; B. BAILYN, supra note 30, at 60 (quoting Samuel
Adams).
51 See generally J. ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY AMONG MEN 88
(M. Cranston rev. ed. 1984) (arguing that the key characteristic separating natural man from the
"beast" is man's "faculty of self-improvement."); W. WILLOUGHBY, THE ETHICAL BASIS OF PoLrrICAL AUTHORITY 201 (1930).
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natively drops over those [neo-Kantian] free agents who find themselves
in the original position. 52 Or consider the integrity of interpretive explanation mastered by Dworkin's Herculean judge.5 3 Or the inspired anarchic vision of Cover, according to which individuals are to be set free
54
from state power to act within multiple local communities of meaning.
Each of these approaches relies, either explicitly or implicitly, upon
a particular understanding of what humans are like. Whether you believe that our intrinsically moral nature allows us to rise to the level of
peaceful and ethical coexistence without externally imposed sanctions, or
that reason will naturally triumph over passion, or that choices based on
private interests ultimately will accrue to the benefit of all, will help you
to determine the kind of political theory that appears most persuasive.
Your preference will also say a good deal about the kind of person you
are, or would like to be.
I maintain that the federal Constitution embodies a particular, complex understanding of human nature and that by endorsing the basic
structural and substantive norms set out in that foundational document,
we accept (at least for purposes of maintaining a shared public world5 5)
that understanding. For example, by breaking up the federal government
into separate branches, the Constitution recognizes the "natural" human
tendency toward domination. The constitutional diffusion of power
evinces such an understanding by deliberately pitting ambition against
ambition, and individual interests and beliefs against individual interests
56
and beliefs, in an ongoing process of mutual checks and balances.
At a deeper level, the Constitution's complex understanding of
human nature translates into a requirement that diverse communities of
power--each with its own characteristic knowledge-actively participate
in public life. Here I will focus on three such communities of powerthe Judiciary, the Legislature, and the Citizenry-with the aim of showing how their unique forms of knowledge and discourse contribute to an
adequately pluralistic constitutional account of human nature.
52 J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11-22 (1971).
53 R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 238-44 (1985).

54 Cover, Nomos, supra note 14.
55 Cf. Cuomo, Excerptsfrom Address by Cuomo at Notre Dame, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1984, at
A21, col. 2 ("Catholic public officials [who] take an oath to preserve the Constitution... do so
gladly, not because they love what others do with their freedom, but because they realize that in
guaranteeing freedom for all, they guarantee our right to be Catholics ..
"); Cuomo, Religious
Beliefand PublicMorality: A Catholic Governor'sPerspective, 1 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POLICY 13, 16 (1984)(reprinting full text of Cuomo speech). But see Kmiec, JudicialSelection and
the Pursuit of Justice, 39 CATH. U. L. REv. 1, 20 (1990).
56 See THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison); see also J. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY
17 (1978) ("There can be little question that the theory of the separation of powers-born from a
psychological understanding of the nature of man and adopted by the Framers as part of the nation's
experiment in fashioning institutional defenses against tyranny-retains an enduring hold on the
American imagination."); Chapman, Voluntary Association and the PoliticalTheory of Pluralism, in
NoMos XI, VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS 94 (1969).
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L On the Knowledge/Discourse of the Judiciary.-Inthe ordinary
course of affairs, which is to say, aside from those relatively rare instances when constitutional politics dominates public life, 57 our legal and
political decisionmaking processes are not designed to give common citi-

zens the final word on matters of policy or principle.5 8 While the citizen's ordinary common sense has a role to play in electing officials,
voting on statewide initiatives or referenda, indicting, convicting or acquitting criminal defendants or imposing sanctions in civil suits, many
other decisions are made on the basis of a different type of knowledge
and discourse.5 9 For example, judges respond to specific legal claims of
right or interest in a context that presupposes technical knowledge about

law (e.g., how to find it, interpret it, and persuasively apply it to concrete
controversies); about existing legal processes and institutions (arising
from the basic structural and substantive constitutional norms that limit
and empower governmental action6°); and about the various cultural
norms that guide judicial decisionmaking (such as the norms of stare
decisis, respect for the authority of inherited legal texts and the norms of
principled decisionmaking, and respect for the future authority of present
judicial texts 6 1).
In other words, whereas the citizen's ordinary common sense calls
upon individual experience and the common knowledge of everyday life
regarding such matters as who to trust with power, who is telling the
truth, whether a particular action warrants condemnation or support,
and what measures are in the individual's best interests, the judge's
source of knowledge and form of discourse are quite different. It is not
the judge's personal experience and common knowledge that authorizes
57 See Ackerman, supra note 37.
58 See Eule, JudicialReview ofDirect Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1521-23, 1538, 1550 n.201,
1559 (1990).
59 See Sherwin, Dialects, supra note 37, at 737-39, 749-55 (defining the characteristics of the
discourse of ordinary common sense knowledge and its role in community representation); see also
Kahn, supra note 41, at 49 (courts have no greater expertise than Congress to keep them in touch
with community values); id at 58:
Representative balancing sets the wrong task before the Court. Instead of calling on legal argument and the unique virtues of the Justice, it calls upon the virtues of statesmanship. But a
Justice is not likely, at least in our political order, to be able to compete successfully with other
political decisionmakers in the domain of statesmanship.
60 See A. BicKEL, supra note 43, at 24. It is also notable that while Marbury v. Madison may not
have been inevitable in our constitutional democracy, even Bickel concedes that judges are best
suited for the kind of principled, text-based interpretive decisionmaking that characterizes their institutional role. Id. at 25-26.
61 See Kahn, supra note 41, at 35:
The twin concepts of precedent and slippery slope remove the individual case from the ordinary
course of political and social history. The case is seen as an ordering event that simultaneously
recasts history and determines the future. In representative balancing, however, the case loses
this atemporal quality; it becomes simply a moment within the ordinary course of time.
See also Sherwin, Dialects,supra note 37, at 769-95 (suggesting that the Supreme Court safeguards
"inherited texts and principles" while searching for "current textual meanings").
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judicial opinions. As Alexander Bickel has said, the Court, in deciding
the case before it, must
giv[e] reasons which rise to the dignity of principle and hence, of course,
have a forward momentum and broad radiations... [T]he Court's peculiar
capacity to enunciate basic principles inheres in large part in its opportunity
to derive and test whatever
generalization it proclaims in the concrete cir62
cumstances of a case.
For Bickel, the judicial virtue of authoring principled decisions in concrete circumstances pointed up both the strength and limitation of the
Court. For while the Court's scholarly and reflective capacity is not ordinarily duplicated among politicians and citizens, this strength is limited
in that the principles the Court articulates may not legally extend beyond
the context of their application. 63 Taking a step beyond Bickel's analysis,
I would contend that the constraints upon judicial principled decisionmaking are not simply a matter of accepted institutional practices, but
also a by-product of principled discourse itself.
When the citizen offers her opinion in the public sphere-by voting
for an official, say, or for a criminal indictment-the opinion is self-operative. That is, the act of utterance performs a task. 64 Similarly, when a
legislator finally casts a vote on a measure that is subsequently enacted
into law, that vote performs a task. If the vote is on the winning side, the
law that results is self-operative. Its word is power. This type of selfoperative discourse may be described as a "performative." That is to say,
the word carries within itself its own authority. It is to be obeyed because it is a rule or an indictment. 65 The manifest or intended meaning
or purpose of the particular words uttered will determine what the law
requires. 66 With principles, however, it is a different matter.
Principles are not performatives. Obedience, therefore, does not immediately flow from the text of the principle alone. Indeed, the authority
of principles lacks actual content absent contextual application. Principles require interpretation in the full context of events in which they are
to be applied before their demands can be properly understood. To speak
of the obligations of "free speech" or "equal protection" or "due process" in isolation from concrete circumstances may be of philosophical
interest. It may even be essential to the task of preparing for a contextualized interpretation. But standing alone, it cannot provide an adequate
62 A. BICKEL, supra note 43, at 69-70.
63 Id.
64 See J. HABERMAS, supra note 24, at 50-59 (discussing the different types of action embodied in
speech); see also J. SEARLE, SPEECH AcTs 50-53 (1969).
65 This goes to the heart of the legal positivist's concern with the validity of rules. For a famous
debate on these issues, see Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,71 HARV. L. REV.
593 (1958); Fuller, Positivism andFYdelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart,71 HARV. L. REV. 630
(1958).
66 Cf H.L.A. HART, supra note 29, at 12 (discussing the "central core of undisputed meaning"
of some legal rules).
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response to the question: What must I do, or refrain from doing? Only in
the context of a real controversy, involving actual parties in a setting rich
with concrete detail, can the normative requirements of an abstract principle be ascertained. 67 The contextualized act of persuasive interpretation gives substance to principle the way characterization and drama give

substance to plot in a novel.
Principled decisionmaking requires a capacity both for abstract re-

flection and concrete contextualization. Principled judicial decisionmaking requires a two-step process: (1) persuasive analysis that explains and
justifies why a particular principle is (or is not) relevant to a particular
set of circumstances; and (2) persuasive interpretation that gives substantive content to the principle based on its application to particular

circumstances.
This discursive account reaffirms the institutional norms that scholars like Bickel68 have attributed to the courts. For example, the initial
question judges face regarding the relevance of a claimed principle to a
particular case involves general reflection upon inherited text-based
69
interpretations.
'Judges and scholars who conflate legislative (performative) rulemaking and principled (persuasively interpreted and contextually applied) ju70
dicial discourse distort the Court's singular institutional competence.
Flattening out the Court's reflective and contextualized interpretation of
applicable principles to the dimension of "self-evident" (or apodictic) or

"intended" textual meanings distorts the Court's singular capacity to
maintain a reciprocal relationship between abstract and concrete analySis. 7 1

The institutional dysfunction that results from substituting (princi-

pled) judicial discourse with (performative) legislative rulemaking
67 See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (describing the
court's task as that of "translating majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights" and of applying them to
specific assertions of official authority).
68 See A. BICKEL, supranote 43; see also Fuller, FormsandLimits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L.
REv. 353, 365-72 (1978).
69 If no previous judicial constructions exist, then the initial question judges face involves general
reflection upon an inherited principle within the concrete circumstances of the specific controversy
before the Court.
70 Justice Rehnquist at times falls within this jurisprudential camp. See Sherwin, supra note 37,
at 808-09.
71 Opposition to the Court's capacity for abstract reflection may be viewed as consistent with the
Legal Realists' impatience with the "mystical" or "transcendent" or "natural justice" element in
law, and their insistence upon functional or pragmatic discourse. Notably, the Realists' preference
for instrumentalist decisionmaking reflects a general tendency in the culture at large. Compare K.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRArrION 446-47 (1960) (on adapting means to preferred ends)
with Rorty, supranote 44, at 641-42 (discussing the contemporary anti-metaphysieal/anti-theoretical
move in Western philosophy).
To the extent that the Realists have strained out inarticulable, nonpersuasive "intuitive" or
"mystical" grounds for judicial decisionmaking, they may certainly be credited with having made a
significant contribution to the legal culture. However, to the extent that their exclusive preference for
instrumentalist discourse simply replaces one inarticulate ground for apodictic certainty (natural law
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presents a twofold danger: the danger of losing actual content as a result

of insisting upon acontextual meaning (i.e., treating principles as if they
were general rules); and the reciprocal danger of flattening out principled
discourse to the extent that concrete contexts alone contain their own
answers-independent of both past and future (i.e., treating principles as
72
if they were no more than bundles of localized interests).

2. On the Knowledge/Discourseof the Legislature.-Fortheir part,
legislators enjoy a different institutional competency, and face a different
institutional dysfumction. 73 Unlike judges, legislators need not make use
of the judicial forms of knowledge and discourse described above.
Rather, the forms of knowledge and discourse best suited to their institutional role lie in the realm of pluralist bargaining (or interest accommodation), the general design and implementation of social planning (or
comprehensive polieymaking), and the effort to maximize preferred notions of the social good. Unlike judges, legislators need not apply their
characteristic source of knowledge and form of discourse to specific
claims of right or interest. Legislators need not adopt the principled and
text-based knowledge/discourse of the judiciary, or for that matter the
often unreflective, internally inconsistent, experience-based knowledge/
discourse of the citizen's ordinary common sense. Rather, it is the
knowledge/discourse of deliberative political compromise, and of expedient utility maximization, that most effectively serves the legislator's institutional role. 74 No matter how diverse, or even inconsistent, the motives
principles, for example) with another (subjective social policy ideologies such as cost/benefit interest
maximization, for example), their contribution may be questioned.
72 For a classic example of this critique, see Justice Black's opposition to the high court's caseby-case ("intuitive") jurisprudence regarding the meaning of due process in Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 74 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Kahn, supra note 41, at 4 (arguing that Justice
Powell's jurisprudence, based largely on the goal of balancing competing interests in a community,
and thus on an "intuition of justice" rather than on an "articulate argument," is indicative of the
instrumentalist danger of case-by-case decisionmaklng on intuitive grounds).
73 One such dysfunction occurs when the legislative process becomes paralyzed with fear and
self-interest. Under such circumstances, there can be no planning-only drift and the scramble to
mirror the polls. See, eg., Oreskes, American PoliticsLoses Way as Polls Replace Leadership, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 18, 1990, at Al & 22 ("We've tended to trivialize issues to the point where meaningful
debate has become almost impossible." [Rep. Edward Mackey of Oklahoma]; "We've got a kind of
politics of irrelevance, of obscurantism .... " [Former Vice President Walter Mondale]; "Bull permeates everything." [Lee Atwater, Republican Party chairman]; "[P]ublic opinion measurement has
become a tool not only of moderm politics but of government .... But the public is often not aware
of the details of problems and polls are measuring emotional response, not thought-out views." [Sen.
James McClure of Idaho]).
74 See Kahn, supra note 41, at 5, 9 (discussing how Powell's "balancing" approach to jurisprudence confuses judicial and legislative functions); see also Chemerinski. The Supreme Court 1988
Term Forward: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43, 51-56 (1989) (discussing
Supreme Court's abdication of principled, interpretive discourse obligations). As Kahn has noted,
the institutional power of pluralist bargaining often reqires investigation, fact finding, and the testimony of experts. The legislature, not the courts, is best suited to accomplish these tasks. Kahn,
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or interests behind voting a measure into law, the law's authority suffices
in and of itself in determining what actions are required or proscribed.
The law's word is its power. Unlike principled judicial discourse (con-

cerning higher law values), the statute operates by the force of its own
will.
3. On the Knowledge/Discourse of the Citizens.-Finally,in addition to channeling the ordinary common sense of citizens, the interpretive wisdom of judges, and the expedience-oriented, interest balancing

and policymaking skills of legislators, the constitutional diffusion of
power also contemplates the potential involvement of more profound
competencies of citizens under special circumstances. For example, arti-

cle V75 attributes to the average citizen the ability to transcend, if necessary, local or private interests and to focus public discourse upon the
higher plane of fundamental structural and substantive norms. 76 For
here the Constitution recognizes that there are times when significant
shifts in public tolerance and belief will require that such changes, following a process of mass public mobilization, shall be engraved by the
supra note 41, at 22-29 (discussing how courts are not suited to handle matters involving empirical
investigation and expertise).
75 Ackerman's "structural amendment" process, if this is to be accepted, imbues the average
citizen with the same abilities. See Ackerman, supra note 37, at 1051-57.
It may be interesting to compare Ackerman's understanding of "constitutional politics" with
Rousseau's understanding of the "general will." See W. WILLOUGHBY, supra note 51, at 208-09
(discussing the "public person" formed by the union of individual members of the body politic that
constitutes what Rousseau calls the "general will"). Ackerman's description of disinterested, higher
principle-based constitutional politics may turn out to correlate in some significant respects to Rousseau's conception of the unified ("true") will of the community, which may exist over and beyond
the normal political will of interest-based, pluralistic bargaining. See id. at 209-11. Whether Rousseau in fact contemplated a distinction between legislative/ordinary politics and constitutional/
higher principles is a question whose answer lies beyond the scope of this essay.
76 Compare Sen, IndividualFreedom as a Social Commitment, The New York Review of Books
49-54 (June 14, 1990):
If individuals do, in fact, incessantly and uncompromisingly advance only their narrow selfinterests, then the pursuit ofjustice will be hampered at every step by the opposition of everyone
who has something to lose from any proposed change. If, on the other hand, individuals as
social persons have broader values and objectives, including sympathy for others and commitment to ethical norms, then the promotion of social justice need not face unremitting opposition
at every move.
Affirming the individual's higher capacities, Sen adds: "[I]f the news of famines, published in newspapers, gets the public outraged and puts the government under pressure, then that is precisely
because people take an interest in what is happening to others." Id. at 54.
The premise of legitimation in a liberal polity, encompassing the acceptability of shared public
norms of public life, presupposes the existence of the individual's higher nature and the capacity to
engage in disinterested public normative discourse. See, eg., Galston, Liberal Virtues, 82 AMER.
POL. Sci. REv. 1277, 1281 (1988) (describing the liberal virtues that most citizens must possess in
order that the liberal community may be preserved). That this ability may not be sustainable as a
regular part of everyday life, and may need to be the concern of the judiciary during those times
when the citizenry is not motivated to rise to a level of disinterest, reflects the sophistication and
complexity of the Constitution's understanding of human nature.
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public upon the supreme law of the land. This acknowledgement, together with the Constitution's articulation of substantive norms regarding basic individual rights, reflects a cautious, but profound commitment
to the ultimate wisdom and authority of the people.77 In the final reckoning of law and power, it is the people's experiential knowledge and
discourse that will prevail. This insight comports not only with the theoretical demands of liberalism, but also with its practical political reality.
I have described this reality as the union of power and the word. It is a
union that is actualized in practice by a sufficient number of citizens sufficiently engaged by, or committed to, the law's word to have its force
78
stick.
In sum, the Constitution's structural diffusion of power, taken together with its substantive norms protecting individual rights, evince a
pluralist understanding of human nature that effectively institutionalizes
a variety of forms of knowledge and discourse in the ordinary (and extraordinary) practices of public life. To rely upon naked power or natural
reason or Kantian categories of right or a preferred theory of interpretation or the spirit of public life or the private pursuit of interests alone,
would thus suggest a naive approach to the complexities of human nature-and perhaps also an invitation to intolerance. In any event, strict
adherence to the theories of Hobbes or Rousseau, Kant or Hume, Bentham or Dworkin, will fail to capture the complex understanding of
human nature that our constitutional framework may be said to embody.
C. Rhetorical Pluralismand the Institutionalizationof Power
To paraphrase Richard McKeon: If the increase and concentration
of knowledge gives rise to an increase and concentration of power, 79 the
antidote to the danger of state tyranny becomes clear. We must diffuse
the power of the state and provide a distinct role for diverse forms of
knowledge. This may be achieved by institutionalizing a discrete separation among the functions of government. Such diversification thus serves
not only as an antidote to tyranny, but also, and no less importantly, as a
means of maximizing participation in public life by diverse communities
of power.
This pluralist approach thus combines confidence in (limited) insti77 See Chisoln v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 448 (1793) ("A state does not owe its origin to the
government of the United States, in the highest or in any of its branches. It was in existence before it.
It derives its authority from the same pure and sacred source as itself: the voluntary and deliberate
choice of the people.").
78 In the absence of broad commitment to shared basic legal principles and processes, the state
may command obedience, but not respect. Without respect, although the state's ability to enforce
rules may continue, its right to rule----Le., its legitimacy-will have ceased.
79 See R. MCKEON, FREEDOM AND HISTORY 22 (1952) ("Knowledge, together with all the
goods of living and life itself, is threatened with extinction by the arbitrary use of power, and the
chief source and concentration of power is knowledge.").
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tutional functions with a more skeptical conviction regarding the necessity for complementary institutional interactions. Since no single
institution can reasonably be expected equally to master multiple tasks,
the natural capacities of particular institutions must be harnessed and
enhanced by establishing opportunities for complementary institutional
strengths to come into play. In short, role diversification checks characteristic institutional dysfunctions by encouraging discrete institutional
capacities. In addition, by maximizing the involvement of diverse communities in the public sphere, role maintenance and inter-institutional
checks and balances foster legitimation. For as we have seen, to maximize participation is also to maximize acceptance of the official
norms
that guide public action, 0 and to maximize acceptance is to ensure governmental legitimacy.8 1
The Constitution's institutionalization of power through diverse discursive communities suggests intrinsic guidelines for the exercise of
power in public life. For example, if public acceptance of judicial power
ultimately turns upon the Court's ability to persuade, unprincipled, arbitrary, or subjective exercises of judicial power will ultimately fail to gain
the legitimacy it needs for purposes of effective enforcement. Citizens
disappointed in their search for a principled basis for the Court's denial
of basic rights may gain the warrant they need to protest the Court's
exercise of power. If their commitment is deep enough, they may also
gain the warrant they need to translate their protest into more direct
forms of action, such as acts of civil disobedience in defiance of the
Court's word.
In addition to the generation of institutional discursive guidelines
based upon discrete intra-institutional virtues, however, we also see the
generation of guidelines for the operation of inter-institutional checks
and balances based upon discrete institutional dysfunctions. For example, if the people ultimately serve as a check upon the Court's abdication
of its role in leading the persuasive articulation of the basic principles of
government, judicial review serves as a check upon legislative dysfunctions, such as the willingness to risk enduring values for the sake of immediate political gains. Obversely, while the courts may be
institutionally ill-suited to the tasks of selective interest accommodation,
80 Cf. Sherwin, Dialects, supra note 37, at 781, n.181 (arguing that the reading of rights to an
accused criminal mandated by the Supreme Court in Mirandav. Arizona helps maintain a "relationship of respect and equality between the accused and the agents of the state").
81 See Waldron, supra note 8, at 128 (arguing that "liberals are committed to a conception of
freedom and of respect for the capacities and the agency of individual men and women, and that
these commitments generate a requirement that all aspects of the social order should either be made
acceptable or be capable of being made acceptable to every last individual."); see also Macedo,supra
note 8, at 280 ("In Court, it is not the fact of power but the display of reasons and evidence that
counts."); id. at 295 ("The aim of liberal public jusitification is to respect diversity while forging a
framework of common moral principles that all can understand, accept, and openly affirm before one
another.").
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information gathering,8 2 and policy setting, these tasks are consonant
with the legislature's chief institutional virtues. For their part, while citizens may elect representatives to act in their best interest, the citizen
cannot partake in the investigative, deliberative, or bargaining practices
that characterize legislative activity. However, to the extent that legislators simply defer to local interests without undertaking the tasks of prudent deliberation and compromise, the legislative function may be
stymied. Comprehensive policymaking cannot be achieved without the
83
exercise of legislative virtues.
To be sure, there are other mechanisms of checks and balances that
the Constitution explicitly establishes. 84 But it is equally important to
recognize the less explicit constitutional guidelines for intra-institutional
competencies, inter-institutional checks and balances, and governmental
legitimation that flow from the constitutional diffusion of power through,
and the necessary participation of, diverse communities and their respective forms of knowledge/discourse. The institutionalization of power
thus directly dovetails with the Constitution's complex (pluralist) understanding of human nature.
It may be conceded that what I have described so far represents an
idealized account of a plurality of discursive functions. To be sure, discursive overlap among diverse institutions of power exists, and should
exist.85 Yet I believe that the ideal types that I have described identify
the singular virtues each of these constitutionally institutionalized discursive communities of power should aspire to realize in practice: the virtues
of judicial integrity and candor (explicitly and persuasively explaining
and justifying principled, text-based interpretive judgments, tempered by
specifically contextualized equity and public compliance concerns); the
virtues of legislative bargaining,deliberation, and comprehensive planning
(realizing selectively preferred policy goals through compromise, based
in part upon relevant data, and tempered by the practical constraints of
politics and public compliance); and the virtue of the citizen's common
sense (reflecting local experience and knowledge concerning whom to
trust with power (e.g., in the election of officials), whom to blame (e.g., in
82 See Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional
Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 366, 379 (1984).
83 See Oreskes, supra note 73; Sen. J. Leach, Who Robbed the Thrifts? Congress, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 2, 1990, at A21, col. 1 (describing the savings and loan debacle of the 1980s as a "criminal
transfer of wealth"- from the Midwest and the Northeast to the Southwest and the West that
occurred "because legislative bodies abandoned the national interest and represented regional and
industry concerns.").
84 For example, Presidential impeachment by the Senate, approval of executive appointments,
the executive veto, the legislature's purse string check upon the executive's marital powers, and so
on.

85 See, eg., Sherwin, Dialects, supra note 37, at 787-90, 796-99 (discussing, in the context of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), how judicial expedience in the form of prudence may
complement principled decisionmaking, but also risks seriously undercutting principle).
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the adjudication of an accused's guilt or innocence) and, in rarer periods
of intense debate and discord over shared fundamental values, reassessing basic principles of government (via constitutional amendment or civil
disobedience)). Intra-institutional competencies and inter-institutional
checks and balances can be effectively maintained to the extent that the
norms of institutional practice constrain each institution from extending
a particular form of knowledge/discourse beyond its proper range of
competence.
D.

The Discourse Ideal and Shared Public Values

Turning from the interconnected issues of human nature and the
nature of the political and legal institutionalization of power, I next address the final matter about which liberalism must present a persuasive
understanding: the matter of shared normative ideals. I maintain that
the theory and practice of rhetorical pluralism and the discourse ideal
provide a persuasive understanding of this matter by articulating the
86
compelling normative force embodied in the ideal of discourse itself.
If structural constitutional norms address issues of institutional
competency and legitimation, the question remains, how do these diverse
institutional functions hold together? In the name of what substantive
norms do officials, or "We the People," authorize or constrain individual
and state action?
Part of the answer lies in the ongoing interpretations of substantive
values (particularly with respect to individual rights) that are to be found
in our constitutional higher law. This response alone, however, is insufficient. For absent the social and political conditions necessary for an individual's (or group's) knowing and voluntary submission to the rule of
law, while the existence of substantive constitutional norms may go unquestioned, their authority will not. The discourse ideal thus not only
addresses the need for persuasive rights talk, but it also accounts for the
normative preconditions necessary to legitimate the constitutional order.
In what follows, I shall argue that fulfillment of the discourse ideal
requires ensuring the conditions necessary to initiate and maintain the
discursive process. That commitment includes the following inter-related elements: (1) Respect for the autonomy and dignity of the other;
(2) a willingness to listen to (and empathize with) the story that the other
has to tell; and (3) a commitment, within the framework established by
mutually acceptable structural and substantive legal norms, to keep the
process of give and take going. Commitment to the discourse ideal thus
requires not only shared constitutionalnorms, but also, and no less importantly, establishing and maintaining social andpolitical conditions regarding the minimum tolerance and beliefs necessary for one to submit to
86 See Sherwin, supra note 7; see also B. ACKERMAN, supra note 12; W. BOOTH, CRITICAL
UNDERSTANDING: THE PowERs AND LiMaTs OF PLURALISM 259 (1979).
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the rule of law. In practical terms, this political requirement means that
every participant in a shared normative world must perceive (and have) a
real stake in the process and outcome of his or her participation. Professor Tribe has eloquently addressed an important aspect of this concern:
One must be able to express oneself to protect the violation of other rights,
but to express oneself one needs at least a decent level of nourishment, shelter, clothing, medical care, and education. To have those things, one needs
either employment or income support. Too easily government may
purchase the silent acquiescence of the deprived in their own constitutional
undoing. People who cannot buy bread cannot follow the suggestion that
they eat cake; people bowed under the8 7weight of poverty are unlikely to
stand up for their constitutional rights.
I believe Tribe is also correct in linking these "indispensable conditions of an open society" to the "much larger enterprise of identifying the
elements of being human."8 8 For, in essence, the political conditions
necessary for voluntary and knowing submission to the rule of law address a profound concern for individual identity.
At a minimum, then, knowing and voluntary submission to the rule
of law presupposes a guarantee of secure and supportive conditions for
the development and flourishing of individual identity. This includes a
sense of identity in the pursuit of personal interests, in association with
others (including family and religious or political communities), and with
regard to the individual's expectations of equal respect and political empowerment in public life generally. Social, political, legal, or economic
conditions that clash severely enough with the individual's sense of identity to threaten its very existence may provide a warrant for the individual to reject the authority of the rule of law. To paraphrase Tribe,
89
subjecting an individual to conditions of profound social alienation,
87 L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 573-74 (1978).

88 Id. at 574; see also id. at 953 (discussing the individual's entitlement to a fair opportunity to
realize her identity in a chosen vocation).
Jurgen Habermas's words are also relevant here: "MIn discourse ethics, the idea of autonomy is
intersubjective. It takes into account the fact that the free actualization of the personality of one
individual depends on the actualization of freedom for all." Habermas, supra note 45, at 49.
Amartya Sen has written:
A social commitment to individual freedom must involve attaching importance to enhancing
the capabilities that different people actually have; the choice of social arrangements must be
influenced by their ability to promote human capabilities.... Shifting the emphasis from primary goods and resources to capabilities and freedoms can make a substantial difference to the
empirical analysis of social inequalities.... The modification of emphasis is relevant also to
other related matters, such as the choice of criteria for assessing deprivation and poverty, eg.,
whether to see poverty in terms of low income (a failure of resource) , or in terms of insufficient
freedom to lead adequate lives (a failure of capability).
Sen, supra note 76, at 54.
89 Cf.Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 84, 101 (1958) ("[Ulse of denationalization as a punishment is
barred by the Eighth Amendment. There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive
torture. There is instead the total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a
form of punishment more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries in the development."); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
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political disenfranchisement 9o or economic servitude91 makes
a mockery
92
of the legal privilege to engage in discourse about rights.
In this high rhetorical account, 93 then, the liberal discourse ideal

envisions a complex reality of multiple public and private roles, and an
ability to exercise appropriate discursive constraints when shifting from
one role to another. 94 This vision also comports with our post-modem
situation. For it describes (and sanctions) multiple forms of reason, mul-

tiple discourses, multiple forms of knowledge, and multiple communities

of power as essential constituents of our shared normative world. 95 But
726 F.2d 191, 199 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding local zoning ordinances unconstitutional on the ground
that, inter alia, state sanctioned isolation, the stigma of illiteracy, and exclusion from normal community patterns would keep a group of mildly to moderately retarded men and women from adequate social adaptation), aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("What is crucial is that a government practice not have
the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval of religion, it is
only practices having that effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political community."); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 272-73 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring):
The barbaric punishments condemned by history, 'punishments which inflict torture, such as
the rack, the thumbscrew, the iron boot'.. . and the like, are, of course, 'attended with acute
pain and suffering'. When we consider why they have been condemned, however, we realize that
the pain involved is not the only reason. The true significance of these punishments is that they
treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as objects to be toyed with and discarded.
(quoting O'Neill v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting)); United States v.
Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 331 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[Tihe protection underlying the right
to a speedy trial may be denied by clandestine innuendo and never given the chance promptly to
defend himself in a court of law. Those who are accused of crime but never tried may lose their jobs,
or their position of responsibility or become outcasts in their communities."); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101, 111 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The uncertainty, and consequent psychological
hurt, which must accompany one who becomes an outcast in his own land must be reckoned a
substantial factor in the ultimate judgement.").
See also M. SANDEL, supra note 6 (contrasting traditional liberal notions of individual autonomy and freedom of choice (the "unencumbered self") with the demands of religious conscience
("the encumbered self")); Bobo & Gilliam, Race, SociopoliticalParticipation,and Black Empowerment, 84 AMER. POL. Sci. REv. 377 (1990) (suggesting that socio-political disempowerment discourages participation in various aspects of public life).
90 See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); United
States v. United States Klans, 194 F. Supp. 897 (M.D. Ala. 1961).
91 See L. TRIBE, supra note 87, at 574 (on the false distinction between economic and personal

rights).
92 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (describing the
universal distrust and distress that would result upon the court's failure to adhere to constitutional
rights in a uniform and inflexible manner).
The matter may be put bluntly: can it reasonably be denied that the deprivation of a meaningful
sense of self and social reality (which may well include the opportunity to obtain decent work, decent
housing, and adequate health and child care) undercuts the individual's participation in public life in
a less significant way than do unequal educational opportunities? Cf. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347
U.S. 483 (1953).
93 See supra note 44; A. MAcINTYRE, supra note 23, at 211-18.
94 See generally J. HABERMAS, supra note 24; see also Ackerman, Why Dialogue?,86 3. PHIL. 5,
20-21 (1989).
95 In other words, according to rhetorical pluralism, the good of the republic requires the preser-
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in this way the discourse ideal also calls to mind the necessity for constraint, for freedom under law, if legitimation through participation is to
be effectively maintained. 96
To be sure, this account of the constitutional and political requirements for legitimation lacks guarantees. 97 It is rooted neither in the universal demands of reason, natural law, or history. 98 It is as uncertain,
perhaps, as knowledge and power. It is rhetorical. And like all rhetorical knowledge and discourse it depends upon persuasion and belief.
Without a critical mass of popular acceptance at any given moment the
state's power may not hold. The ultimate fate of government hinges on
our sense of union-our common belief in shared principles of public
order and our perception of the political conditions necessary for the secure cultivation of identity.
E. An Admonition
Institutional failure is hard to contain. When one institution fails to
deal with the tasks delegated to it, this may induce other institutions to
fill the void. For example, when political leaders fail to provide clear
policy goals for the nation, or when courts fail to stand by enduring constitutional values, it may fall upon We the People to raise their voicesthrough legal and extra-legal forms of action. Here, too, lies a danger.
For when local communities end up taking over the main judging or
planning tasks of the state, when substantive principles and policy goals,
based on local forms of knowledge and experience, dominate public discourse, broad principles and comprehensive planning may become impossible to attain. 99
When a discrete power base comes to dominate the political and
legal scene, its unchecked discursive incapacities take on greater significance. Judges act on impulse, or ideology, without reference to inherited
legal authorities or principles. Legislators mandate rigid rules of conduct
for all, according to popular demand, heedless of local beliefs of socially
unpopular groups. Citizens demand quick answers to pressing problems,
vation, and active public involvement, of local knowledge (in the form of ordinary common sense),
collective policy making (in the form of interest-based deliberation and cost/benefit instrumental
analysis), and interpretive principles (textually based and contextually applied-even if they appear
counter-intuitive.) Cf Burke, supra note 49.
Contrast this cognitive/rhetorical pluralism with Rawls's and Greenawalt's (among others')
tendency to attribute one form of reason to human nature. K. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CoNVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 11-12, 56-57 (1988); J. RAWLS, supra note 52, at 236.
96 See E. LEviNAS, COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 17 (1986) ("[W]e must impose commands on ourselves in order to be free... it must be an exterior law, a written law, armed with force
against tyranny.").
97 See Sherwin, supra note 7, at 1815-29.
98 See Rawls, The Domain of the Politicaland Overlapping Consensus, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 233,
235 (1989).
99 See Sherwin, Dialects, supra note 37.
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regardless of long range effects or compromised principles. Government
action becomes suspect. Internal disputes and disarray increase among
communities and institutions which compete with increasing intensity for
more authority to pursue a subjectively preferred set of ends or values.
This scenario portrays a drama of disunion. It reflects the dangers
of a legal system struggling to continue in the absence of a shared vision,
without consensus on shared normative ideals. It tells the story of a legal
system in possession of the common tools of war but without a common
sense of poetry.
Thus we return once again to the rhetorical vision of the discourse
ideal. It is here that we find a larger framework to contain our diversity.
It is in the hope of rediscovering the persuasive force of this liberal discursive vision that I am telling this story of legitimation.
I submit that at this critical juncture in our history prudent reflection upon the requirements of legitimation should persuade us to accept
the following:
(1) that liberal ideals be understood in a high rhetorical sense, and that
rhetorical pluralism and the discourse ideal be viewed as integral to liberal
theory and practice; this normative framework for individual and state action in the public sphere encourages officials and citizens alike 1°° to accept
a view of liberty for all under law, where acceptance of the law's constraints
includes:
(2) that the discrete discursive practices of various governmental and nongovernmental institutions of power be properly maintained in order effectively to diffuse power, encourage active participation by multiple
communities, and check and balance particular institutional discursive capacities against their characteristic dysfinctions; and
(3) that "We the People" ensure that every member of the polity has a
real stake in the process and outcome of his or her participation in the
public arenas of power, and that this guarantee be maintained through
widely accepted structural and substantive constitutional norms (which
provide safeguards against majoritarian dominance) and through broad
public acceptance of the social and political conditions necessary to justify
and explain each member's knowing and voluntary submission to the rule
of law.
This account of legitimation seeks to provide a persuasive rendering
of the three matters about which liberalism must offer an acceptable understanding: human nature, the institutionalization of power, and shared
normative ideals. I believe it also provides additional clarity and guidance with regard to the chief task of democratic government: to mediate the insistent demands of liberty, community, and social justice.
Those outside the realm of meaningful discursive participation may
or may not obtain the warrant they need to deny the state's legitimacy100 See Sherwin, Opening Hart's Concept of Law, 20 VAL. U.L. REv. 385 (1986) (arguing that,
contrary to Hart, citizens as well as officials need to accept fundamental values for legitimation
purposes).
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and to back their denial with force (if need be). If they have beenforced
outside the avenues of meaningful participation by unacceptable state action-such as racist legislation or unjustified state interference with religious conscience-then the proper warrant for resistance may be at
hand.
Those armed with a proper warrant to resist state power may, of
course, fail to achieve their goals. At a certain poiit, however, their
numbers and resources might grow large enough significantly to curtail
or interrupt law enforcement. This is one way of precipitating a legitimation crisis,1 0 1 as a result of which constitutional transformations may or
may not flow.
Ordinarily, the criminal outclass does not obtain a similar warrant
to reject the state's legitimacy. (Indeed, they are often needed by the
state for it (forcibly) to reaffirm and publicly underscore its legitimacy.)
However, while criminal punishments usually do not embody illegitimate
power, it is conceivable that this, too, could precipitate the creation of a
critical mass of opponents to the state (a permanent outlaw under-class,
say) whose power of resistance suffices significantly to curtail or interrupt
102
law enforcement.
This scenario presents a drama of domestic chaos and of the state's
reactive compromising of fundamental principles in an effort to secure
social order. Under these circumstances, the nemesis of compromised
principle once again threatens the republic with disruption and violence. 10 3 For example, if criminal prosecutions belie profound (widely
perceived) social injustices, the agency of state power becomes one with
injustice itself-at least, in the minds of the oppressed or the disadvantaged. For these people, it is by the state's power that injustice is "legitimated" under the authority of existing laws. In the criminal outclass
context, all that is missing for such a legitimation crisis to take shape is a
unifying ideological/political thematization which persuasively translates
and consolidates the criminal outclass situation into an acceptable idiom
of legitimation discourse."14
101 Consider the abolitionist movement against slavery: spearheaded spiritually by Garrison and
spiritually as well as violently by John Brown.
102 See Morris, The Decline of Guilt, 99 ETHics 62 (1988) (noting a shift in the criminal process,
from justice, individual rights and due process on the one hand, to fear and cost/benefit ideology on
the other, which has the effect of diluting respect for the law's norms and of external values
generally).
103 Other examples of such ill-fated compromises include the constitutional enshrinement of slavery (making slaves 3/5 human and 2/5 chattel), see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; the decision in
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (nullifying federal law designed to prevent slavery's
spread to certain national territories); and the decision in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(deferring to majoritarian will and local customary preferences favoring segregation in lieu of providing a principled interpretation of the demands of equality). Each of these profound compromises of
principle precipitated protracted, and sometimes bloody, protest.
104 Consider, for example, the self-empowering rhetoric of Malcolm X and the separatist rageinspired (and rage inspiring) rhetoric of Louis Farrakhan.
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What this scenario describes is a political, not a constitutional, crisis. As we have seen before, however, today's political crisis might well
become tomorrow's constitutional change. Consider: What legal authority empowered the American revolutionaries, or the Northern antislavery fighters acting in the face of Dred Scott, or the post-Depression
era supporters of the New Deal acting in the shadow of Lochner's laissez-faire constitutionalism, or the civil rights protesters in the South acting in the face of "legalized" segregation?
These are examples of a mobilized citizenry, sometimes acting at
great personal risk, and almost always out of profound commitment to
higher principles, who succeeded in changing America. But they did not
always start out by framing their concerns in constitutional terms. In
any event, the fact remains that whether or not we credit such mass
movements with constitutional authority 0 5 makes no difference with regard to their political authority. These movements effectuated shifts in
the minimum tolerance and beliefs necessary to justify and explain the
individual's knowing and voluntary submission to the rule of law. Since
this political reality is an essential determinant of the conditions for legitimation, we should not be surprised to find that it alone can alter the
nature of our polity. Put simply, if officials fail to recognize the political
prerequisites to legitimation, their ability to make their words stick will
diminish-perhaps to the vanishing point.
The price of such failure may be paid in the currency of social cohesion and domestic order. To avert so profound a crisis, it may become
necessary for courts and legislatures actively and persuasively to reconstrue the meaning of our higher law. Whether inner city violence, for
example, will rise to the level of political authority for legal change, depends on the circumstances and individuals involved. It is difficult to
predict whether the current official response to inner city frustration,
alienation, and violence will alter the minimum tolerance and beliefs necessary for political legitimation. So long as violence remains associated
with criminality, and in particular with individual participation in
counter-cultural markets provided by the drug trade (unlike the inner
105 Cf. Ackerman, supra note 37 (describing the New Deal as a "structural amendment"). That
popular capture of all three branches of government provides a persuasive indication that the People's voice has sounded may perhaps be accepted. However, more often the mass mobilization in
question is not as sweeping. At such times, persuasive argumentation in principle is the court's, and
an engaged citizenry's, most reliable strength. It is in the common public arena of law and politics
that the differences between these two institutions will have to be worked out. If more direct public
confrontation must be risked, at times, by the court, we may at least take solace from the knowledge
that this is one of the ways in which a constitutional democracy works. Consensus on basic principles of government-a minimum requirement of legitimation in a liberal polity-carries no less a
price than periodic public contention and strife-and at times, even violence.
That the price of commitment to principle is so high offers the additional consolation that only
infrequently, and for good cause, will enough people risk placing their bodies on the line, if need be,

for the sake of a minimum of political tolerance and belief or of shared constitutional values.
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city violence in the 1960s) it may never gain sufficient principled support
in other communities of power to change existing conditions. Public indignation and official repression may therefore continue to mask its complex political, economic, and social dimensions. Nevertheless, denial of
the deeper political nature underlying this violence (on both sides of the
conflict), like denial generally, may well culminate in a characteristic
paradox. Denial often helps to actualize the very fears that fuel our urge
to deny in the first place. 10 6 At any rate, that the political potential contained in the current cycle of criminality and official repression may
eventually be politicized as a legitimate resistance to official repression
remains an everpresent and potent possibility.
The account of the law and the law's legitimation that I have narrated here may or may not be acceptable. But some such tale of law's
normative ideals and institutional safeguards, and of the political and
legal conditions necessary for accepting the rule of law, must be broadly
and actively embraced. Otherwise, what is "America?" Why do we say
"yes" to her power? Why do we not protest or revolutionize-politically
or criminally?
The premise that the law's ultimate instruments are war and poetry
now lays down its claim. It is a claim of ethical responsibility: to self
and group identity (to the extent that certain socio-political conditions
must be met prior to the individual's submission to the rule of law), 10 7 to
others (to the extent that our liberty cannot be guaranteed except under
law), and to a commonly shared public world (to the extent that our
individual fate is inextricably connected to the fate of our nation, and to
the structural, substantive, and social justice norms that we take for our
own).

0 8

When our stories of law and power break apart or grow confused,
there is the danger of war without poetry. And that prospect, history
teaches, is the classic invitation to tyranny. Only when our stories of
legitimation find a common ground can there be union amid diversity.
Only then can difference be civilly contained, which is to say, kept within
106 See generally Wurmer, Blinding the Eye of the Mind, in DENIAL, A CLARIFICATION OF CONCEFPTs AND RESEARCH 178 (E.L. Edelstein, D. Nathanson & A. Stone eds. 1989):
In denial the subject shifts his focal attention from disturbing stimuli emanating either from
himself or from the environment to less disturbing stimuli, fantasies or ideas. Denial, then, is the
collective term used for all forms of defense directed against perception... such defense may
remove from focal attention specific cognitive meaning (or significance) and affective tones that
could arouse pain or anxiety.
107 The responsibility to cultivate and maintain identity includes both the classic liberal understanding of individual autonomy (the "unencumbered self") and what Sandel has referred to as
group based identity (the "encumbered self"). See M. SANDEL, supra note 6.
108 Cf. Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 479, 501 (1989):
[The integrated liberal] will count his own life as diminished-a less good life than he might
have had-if he lives in an unjust community, no matter how hard he tries to make it just. That
fusion of political morality and critical self-interest seems to me to be the true nerve of civic
republicanism, the important way in which individual citizens should merge their interest and
personality into political community.

416
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the bounds of discourse rather than cast outside: in the silent terror of
naked violence. Only when we find and accept the civilizing ideal that
unites us will the bow and lyre of the liberal state become one. 09
With this account of rhetorical pluralism and the discourse ideal in
mind, let us now turn to a specific test case. How do the foregoing discursive criteria for intra-institutional competencies and inter-institutional
checks and balances affect our understanding of the Supreme Court's decision in Division of Employment v. Smith? Are the legal and political
requirements for legitimation met by that decision? And if not, what is to
be done?
III.

COUNTERING DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT V. SMITH: A PARABLE
OF PAGANS, POLITICS, AND MAJORITARIAN RULE

Let us begin with a legal story, one of the innumerable narratives
that pass through our court system every day. For purposes of our analysis, let the story unfold at the outset through the voice of the claimant.
With the aid of this dramatic device, we may begin our exploration of
this case with heightened sensitivity to its human reality. For it is, after
all, human voices that precipitate and pervade every legal and political
drama that unfolds in the public sphere. The plaintiff speaking here is in
the position of Alfred L. Smith, whose story is told in Division of Employment v. Smith. 110 He begins his tale this way:
I've lost my job. I was fired when I admitted to having used an illegal
drug. When I subsequently tried to collect unemployment benefits, the government refused to pay. Officials at the Division of Employment told me
that I didn't qualify because of my "misconduct." But I didn't think my use
of the drug was wrong. So I initiated a lawsuit challenging the government's position. The state court eventually concluded that I was right, that
it was unconstitutional under the particular circumstances of my case for
the Division of Employment to refuse to provide me with unemployment
compensation. But the United States Supreme Court disagreed. Here's
how this controversy got started.
I'm an American citizen; I am also a religious person. My religious
beliefs and practices, however, are not particularly familiar to most Americans. I am a member of the Native American Church.
I understand that in the religious ceremonies of Christians and Jews,
wine is consumed as a sacrament. In my church, the sacrament is a sacred
mushroom. It is called peyote. That's the illegal drug that I have used.
And it is that use that got me fired without unemployment benefits.
My religion has been misunderstood. It also has been deliberately dis109 Until then, the struggle between persuasive discourse and mute violence will continue. Cf.
Cover, supra note 14.
110 The factual account that follows draws from Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Serv., 301 Or. 209, 721 P.2d 445 (1986).
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torted by those who oppose it.1 So let me say a few words about its ceremonies, and the values that it seeks to uphold in everyday life.112
Like just about all religions, my religion has a doctrine, an ethic, and
specific rituals.
The doctrine includes belief in the existence of power, spirits, and incarnations of power. "Power" is the Native American equivalent to what
the Greek New Testament calls "pneuma" or "Holy Spirit" or "Holy
Ghost." It refers to an invisible force that produces characteristic effects in
things that are influenced by it. Members of my church believe that power
is necessary to human health and success. "Spirits" are immaterial personifications of power. For example, we call God "the Great Spirit." He is the
ultimate source of all power. For some, there are other spirits, including
Jesus, who intercedes between God and man, and the Holy Ghost, which
cannot be described, or Waterbird, who brings rain, and peyote itself, which
is personified as "Peyote Spirit." Eating peyote allows one to absorb the
power inherent in it. It is a sacrament that is consumed in order to absorb
the Holy Spirit.
My religion's ethical code requires that I follow "the Peyote Road."
This ethic has four main parts: brotherly love, care of family, self-reliance,
and avoidance of alcohol. The code is learned from elders and by ethical
revelation, received by eating peyote. Peyote sensitizes the conscience.
There is a maxim that says: "Peyote enlightens your heart and mind."
The ritual practices of my religion are highly structured. The central
rite takes place during an all-night meeting, from about 8:00 p.m. on Saturday until 8:00 a.m. the next day. There are many ritual devices that are
used and specific roles to be played during the ceremony, but I will not
detail them here. Suffice it to say, there are basically four sequential phases
to the ceremony: prayer, song, eating peyote, and quietly contemplating.
Now, the criminal laws of my state say that eating peyote is a crime,
like taking LSD or heroin. But I've never been charged with, much less
convicted of, any criminal act. And in any event, the Division of Employment says that the state's criminal laws had nothing to do with its decision
to keep me from getting unemployment benefits after my discharge. They
say that the Division has to "protect the unemployment fund from depletion by those who are undeserving." But I just don't see how my religious
practices jeopardize that fund.
By denying me unemployment compensation the state seems to be saying that I don't deserve what other people have a right to expect from the
government. I guess I just don't see why I should be penalized because of
my religious beliefs. Who am I harming? Why don't I have a right to prac111 Opposition to Native American religious practices dates back to 1571, when the Spanish Inquisition was introduced into Mexico. By 1620, Spanish officials had declared that since the use of
peyote was the work of the devil, all Christians were also prohibited from using it. See E. ANDERSON, PEYOTE, THE DIVINE CAcTus 6, 162 (1980) (citing an edict issued in 1629 by the Inquisition
which barred the use of peyote by any person ("of whatever rank or social condition") and subjected
the law breaker to various punishments, including the charge of "heresy to our Holy Catholic
Faith.").
112 The account that follows, describing the Native American Church's religious practice of
peyotism, draws from J. SLOTKIN, THE PEYOTE RELIGION 68-77 (1975).
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tice my religion in private without being made to feel like an enemy of
society? It just doesn't seem right. Not in America.
That, as far as I can tell, is the essence of Smith's claim. A few more
background facts are in order, however, before we trace how his lawsuit
fared in the courts.
In addition to being an active member of the Native American
Church, the 66-year-old Smith was also an ex-alcoholic. He stopped
drinking in 1957, and had no subsequent alcohol problem. Before being
fired, he worked as a counselor to alcoholics. When he accepted the job
he also accepted his employer's policy regarding drug and alcohol abuse.
Since counselors were regarded as role models, they were not to abuse
alcohol or use mind-altering substances.
When his employer learned that Smith's religious practices included
the ingestion of peyote, Smith was informed that this violated the employer's policy and, consequently, that Smith would have to be fired.
Smith rejected the employer's offer to stay on provided that he submit to
medical or psychological treatment, because he did not feel that he
needed the help offered.
When the Oregon Employment Division subsequently denied Smith
unemployment benefits, on the ground that he was discharged for "misconduct," Smith appealed. Following a hearing, the referee concluded:
"[Because] there is no evidence in the hearing record to indicate that
granting benefits to claimants whose unemployment is caused by adherence to religious beliefs would have any significant impact on the [state's
unemployment] trust fund, it cannot be held that the alleged state interest warrants interference with the claimant's freedom of religion."
The Employment Appeals Board reversed the referee's finding. It
reasoned that since the state had a "compelling interest in proscribing
illegal drugs," the denial of benefits was justified.
Smith subsequently took the case to the Oregon courts, and won.
The Oregon Supreme Court conceded that Smith's employer had a right
to fire him when he violated an order, based on a valid employment policy, to at least seek drug counseling for his peyote use. However, the
court went on to conclude that the state's denial of employment benefits
unduly burdened Smith's right to worship as he sees fit.
The Oregon court based its analysis on the free exercise clause of the
federal Constitution's first amendment. The leading case in the area is
Sherbert v. Verner.11 3 In Sherbert, the Court held that a Seventh-Day
Adventist need not agree to work on Saturday in order to be eligible for
unemployment benefits. To require her to do so, the Court said, would
constitute an impermissible pressure upon her to forego her religious
113 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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practice: 114
[Such a requirement] forces her to choose between following the precepts of
her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of
the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the
free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her
Saturday worship.... It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of
religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege. 115
The Sherbert court felt compelled to create an exemption to the state's
Unemployment Compensation Act based on the claimant's religious beliefs, unless the government could show that some "compelling state interest" justified "the substantial infringement" of her first amendment
right. 116 In addition, the government was obliged to show that it was
using the least restrictive means to achieve its interest.
Since Sherbert,this analysis-at least as it applies to unemployment
benefits-has been repeatedly reaffirmed by the Court. 1 17 In this line of
cases the protection of the free exercise clause extends even to incidental
or unintended effects of government action. The underlying principle
may perhaps be framed this way: When majoritarian rule results in laws
that reflect ignorance, hostile presuppositions, or indifference toward another's religious beliefs and practices, the authority of those laws must
give way before the higher law obligations of freedom of religion.' 1 8 At
least, such was the Supreme Court's general understanding before Smith.
Given Sherbert and its progeny, it is hardly surprising that Smith
won when his case came before the Oregon Court of Appeals and Oregon
Supreme Court. As in Sherbert, and more recently in Thomas v. Review
Board and Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, here
too the plaintiff was denied unemployment benefits because of his religious practice. The Oregon courts found that such a denial constituted a
114
115
116
117

Id. at 410.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 406.
See, ag., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981). As
Michael McConnell has noted, however, outside the narrow context of unemployment benefits, the
Court has rejected every claim for a free exercise exemption that has come before it. McConnell, The
Origins and Historical Understandingof Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1410, 1417
(1990). McConnell has also strongly opposed, on historical grounds, the Court's interpretation of the
meaning of the free exercise clause. Id. at 1420, 1516 ("Rather than try to foster an ecumenical
spirit, the state allows each sect to promote its own cause with zeal. The Madisonian perspective
points toward pluralism, rather than assimilation, ecumenism, or secularism, as the organizing principle of church-state relations."). McConnell concludes that the Court "should extend its protection
to religious groups that, because of their inability to win accommodation in the political process, are
in danger of forced assimilation into our secularized Protestant culture." Id.
118 See McConnell, supra note 117, at 1418.
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significant and impermissible burden on Smith's free exercise rights. 119
Nor were government officials able to show a compelling interest to justify the burden that it imposed. For example, the Division of Employment conceded that "the legality of [claimant's] ingestion of peyote has
little direct bearing on this case." 120 The Oregon Supreme Court therefore concluded that "the state's interest is simply the financial interest in
the payment of benefits from the unemployment insurance fund to this
claimant and other claimants similarly situated." 12 1 Accordingly, the
state had no greater interest than the one articulated in Sherbert. And
that interest, when weighed against the plaintiff's right, could not be considered compelling. "The state has not shown that the financial stability
of the fund will be imperiled by claimants applying for religious exemp122
tions if this claimant receives benefits."
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court took a different
tack. For the majority, the legality of Smith's peyote use raised an essential question. According to the Court, if Oregon's criminal laws provided no exception to Smith's religious use of peyote, Smith would have
no "legitimate" claim to the free exercise of religion. 123 In that event, the
Sherbert analysis simply would not apply. The Court remanded the case
to the Oregon Supreme Court for an opinion on the legal status of
Smith's religiously motivated use of peyote.
In compliance with the Supreme Court's request, the Oregon
Supreme Court addressed the legality of Smith's peyote use and concluded that while Oregon's law against possession of controlled substances, including peyote, made no exception for the sacramental use of
peyote, its prohibition of such use by members of the Native American
Church "would violate the First Amendment directly and as interpreted
124
by Congress."
When the case canie before the Supreme Court on certiorari a second time, a majority of the Justices concluded that the Oregon Supreme
Court had gotten it wrong. The first amendment's free exercise clause
does not protect religious practices that are in violation of "an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate." 125 The
anti-exemption, previously dissenting perspectives of Justices Rehnquist
and Stevens had now won the day. 126 Under their view, since the state's
119 See Smith v. Employment Div., 301 Or. 209, 721 P.2d 445 (1986).
120 Id. at 220, 721 P.2d at 450.
121 Id. (Smith was never charged with criminal possession of drugs).
122 Id. at 220, 721 P.2d at 451.
123 Employment Div. v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 671-72 (1988).
124 Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 73-75, 763 P.2d 146, 148-49 (1988) (referring to 1965
and 1978 congressional acts exempting religious use of peyote from criminal sanctions).
125 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600.
126 See McConnell, supra note 117, at 1417-18:
Chief Justice Rehnquist has contended that when "a State has enacted a general statute, the
purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the Free Exercise clause does
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criminal laws can indirectlyprohibit Smith's religion altogether, the State
Employment Division could certainly impose the lesser indirect penalty
of denying Smith unemployment benefits. But how can this be right?
How can the state prohibit a disapproved religion?
For Justice Scalia, who wrote the majority opinion in Smith, the first
key move came in returning to an understanding of the free exercise
clause that the Court embraced in 1879. In Reynolds v. United States,127
the Court ruled that the defendant's religious beliefs provided no defense
against state polygamy laws. The Court reasoned that while the state
lacked the authority to interfere with "mere religious belief and opinions," it could make laws that regulate religious "practices." 128 And
that, Justice Scalia concluded, is precisely what Oregon had done here.
Moreover, since the criminal law in question was a "valid and neutral
law of general application," and since Smith's religion was only indirectly affected, he could not complain about the law's effect-even if that
129
"effect" was to prohibit his religion altogether.
According to Scalia, the free exercise of religion is a right that has
never carried very much weight. It is only when the free exercise clause
is connected with other first amendment rights, such as freedom of
speech and of the press, or the right of parents to direct the education of
their children, that the application of a neutral, generally applicable law,
like the criminal law at issue in Smith, could be barred. 130 But in Smith's
case, no such "hybrid situation" existed. 3 1 So given that the state is
authorized to regulate a general class of activities that happens to include
the religious practice in which Smith had engaged, 132 and given that the
free exercise right, standing alone, cannot impede a law of this kind,
Smith had no constitutional right to challenge the law's effect. And if the
free exercise right didn't come into play, how could Sherbert'sbalancing
test apply?
Commentators have questioned the correctness of the way that
Reynolds split off religious belief from religious practice, 13 3 and with
not... require the State to conform that statute to the dictates of religious conscience of any
group," (citing Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. at 723 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). Justice
Stevens has stated that there is "virtually no room for a constitutionally required exemption on
religious grounds from a valid.. .law that is entirely neutral in its general application," (citing
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring)).
127 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
128 Id. at 166-67.
129 This analysis closely tracks the discredited analysis of Justice Frankfurter in Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), and the view of four Justices in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693 (1986). See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) ("Five
Justices expressly rejected this argument in Roy.... We reject the argument again today.").
130 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1601-02.
131 Id. at 1602.
132 See, eg., id. at 1600 (on "incidental effect").
133 See, e.g., Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty, 37
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 674, 736 (1987); Currie, The Constitution and the Supreme Court FullFaith
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good reason. Does it make sense simply to tell a person in Smith's position, "Sure, go ahead and believe in your religion, just cut out its sacrament and ceremonies." Does anyone seriously believe that a religious life
can be led on such terms? Surely some further explanation must be in
order. When the state forces a person to cease exercising her religion in
the way that she sees fit, surely some additional justification is due.
But my purpose here is not to revisit this familiar complaint against
Reynolds. Instead, I want to apply the criteria for legitimation that I
offered in Section II to Justice Scalia's majority opinion and Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Smith. I will first assess the discursive
competency of each opinion. The structural constitutional norms that
maintain institutional checks and balances, and the legal criteria they
generate, will come into play at this stage of the analysis. Next, I will
address the substantive norms involved in the Smith case. The legal and
political criteria for legitimation implicit in what I have referred to as the
discourse ideal will inform this second stage of the analysis.
A.

StructuralConstitutionalNorms of Discursive Competency

L Justice Scalia'sMajority Opinion: The Discursive Dysfunction of
Abdicating Judicial Review to the PoliticalProcess of Majority Rule.Principled discourse, the contextualized application of text-based inherited norms, is the singular competency of the judiciary. In Justice
Scalia's majority opinion in Smith, however, two closely interrelated discursive dysfunctions displace the court's ordinary virtues. Instead of reflectively providing explanation of, and justification for a particular
contextualized interpretive encounter with an applicable text-based principle-namely, the right freely to exercise one's religion-the majority
speaks a language of fiat, redolent with a fear of social disorder. In this
way, the Court emulates the performative rhetoric characteristic of legislation. Indeed, the majority in Smith not only abandons principled discourse, but explicitly defers to the political process and its dominant
discourse of pluralist bargaining among competing interests. The institutional role of judicial review thus blends into legislative policy management. As a result, the judiciary's check upon the legislature is lost. The
passions of the majority-in this case, fueled by fears of drug abuse and
criminality-rule without principled restraint. The discursive dysfunctions at work here encompass two interconnected strategies: first, the
Court's deconstitutionalization of basic aspects of the freedom of reliand the Bill of Rights 1889-1910, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 867, 868 n.10 (1985); Greenawalt, Religion as
a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 753, 778-79 (1984); Ingber, Religion orIdeology:
A Needed Clarificationof the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REv. 233, 291 (1989); Lupu, Where
Rights Begin: The ProblemofBurdens on the Free Exerciseof Religion, 102 HARV. L. REv. 933, 93742, 963 (1989); Note, Developments in the Law-The Religion and the State: V FreeExerciseAccommodation of Religion, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1703, 1736 (1987).
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gious conscience; and second, its deference to majority rule over principled discourse. Let us examine each of these moves more closely.
According to Justice Scalia, "a free exercise claim unconnected with
any communicative activity or parental right" is insufficient to challenge
the authority of a "neutral, generally applicable law." 134 Consequently,
the state need not articulate a compelling interest or employ the least
restrictive means for realizing its preferred goals. 135 The reason for this
distinction between free exercise and other first amendment values thus
becomes of great interest. Scalia's account of the distinction, however, is
based upon a simple, unexplained assertion: protecting the free exercise
136
right does not "produce" a "constitutional norm."
In Scalia's analysis, the first amendment rights that trigger close judicial scrutiny and require a "compelling government interest" to trump
the protections they afford, are rights that lead to "equality of treatment"
and "an unrestricted flow of contending speech." These purposes embody "constitutional norms."' 137 In contrast, the "purpose" being advanced by someone like Smith fails to embody any norm at all; indeed, it
is "a constitutional anomaly."' 138 Why? Because in this case, the Court
sees the free exercise right producing anarchy. As Scalia puts it, Smith's
139
claim represents "a private right to ignore generally applicable laws."
This is an odd formulation. To begin with, it is strange to speak of
individual rights in terms of their "purposes." One would think it more
apt to speak in terms of the values the right embodies, not what it advances-as if the content and effect were somehow distinct and exclusive.
But this rhetoric is useful. Once the content of the right is occluded by its
effect, the importance of addressing the former seems to fade. Thus, instead of addressing the value of protecting an individual's religious belief
and practice, the Court discusses an entirely different matter: how an
individual's religion can threaten the social order. In this way, the key
public values of law and order displace "private" rights. 140
134 Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1601-02.
135 See id. at 1603-04 (on the inapplicability of Sherbert's balancing test). Again, in tracking
Justice Frankfurter's analysis in Gobitis, it is curious that Justice Scalia makes no reference to the
fact that Barnette overruled Gobitis two years after it was decided.
136 Id. at 1604.
137 Id.
138 Id.

139 Laws... are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere
[sic] religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.... Can a man excuse his practices
to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed
doctrines of religion belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself.
Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1600 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879)).
It is noteworthy that Reynolds equates legislative enactments with the "law of the land." But
what of the supreme law of the land embodied in constitutional principles of higher law?
140 Cf.Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519 (1972) (where Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
assesses the right to a speedy trial in terms of public ("societal") interest, rather than as an individual
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The phrase "constitutional anomaly" seems to stem from Scalia's
implicit assumption that the Constitution exists to protect the social order, not threaten it. Simply put, values or purposes that threaten the

social order cannot be "constitutional." 14 1 This assumption may be correct, but not in the terms Scalia uses. The social order is, after all,
founded upon fundamental shared principles of government that both

enable and constrain state action. These basic principles of government
are antecedent (and normatively superior) to the laws enacted through
pluralist bargaining and majority will. In Scalia's "flattened" analysis,
however, to threaten the dictates of majority rule-as expressed through

normal, self-operative legislative enactments-is equivalent to threatening the social order itself. Thus Scalia uses the word "private" to modify

the "right" to freely exercise one's religion, but not the rights to "equal
treatment" or "unrestricted speech." The latter rights, presumably, are
"public" rights. That is, they serve society's general interests; they do
not subserve the individual at the expense of the social order. They do

not, in Scalia's terms, turn "each conscience [into] a law unto itself." 142
One of the problems with Scalia's analysis is that the free exercise

right may readily turn out to mean nothing if it is parasitic upon majority
rule.1 43 As Justice Jackson suggested in Board of Education v. Barnette, 144 the key feature of fundamental constitutional rights is that they

transcend the felt needs or interests that a legislative majority happens to
articulate at a particular point in time. 145 Scalia may be correct in saying
that the free exercise clause protects a domain that is profoundly private,
but this in itself offers no reason to alter (and effectively nullify) the pub(private) right, thus making it easier for the Court to reject the defendant's claimed waiver of the

right).
141 Contrast W. DouOLxs, THE RiGHT OF THE PEOPLE 18 (1958) ("There is no free speech in
the full meaning of the term unless there is freedom to challenge the very postulates on which the

existing regime rests.").
142 Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1606.
143 See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634, 644 (1942):
If official power exists to coerce acceptance of any patriotic creed, what it shall contain cannot
be decided by the courts, but must be largely discretionary with the ordaining authority, whose
power to prescribe would no doubt include the power to amend. Hence validity of the asserted
power to force an American citizen publicly to profess any statement of belief or engage in a
ceremony of assent to one, presents questions of power that must be considered independently
of any idea we may have as to the utility of the ceremony in question... The ceremonial, when
enforced against conscientious objectors, more likely to defeat than to serve its high purpose, is
a handy implement for disguised religious persecution.
144 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (overruling Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 486 (1940)).
145 See iL at 638:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials to establish
them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to
free speech, a free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.
This states the dual track (higher law/normal politics) distinction articulated by Ackerman and
conflated by Scalia in his majority opinion in Smith.
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lic constitutional dimension of the right itself. After all, it was largely in
order to carve out a private sphere, free from state regulation, that the
Bill of Rights was adopted in the first place. 14 6 In this respect, it is
Scalia's discourse that seems anomalous. 147 If the constitutional guarantee against state prohibition of the free exercise of religion represents
higher law, then elevating the individual above the "law of the land" is
precisely what the Bill of Rights requires. For it is a supreme law of the
land that does so, and in the process protects individual freedom against
impermissible governmental encroachment.
Of course, to say that the value content of the free exercise right
exists independently of its effect upon the social order is not to conclude
that that right is absolute. However, for a court to determine its limits it
must explicitly articulate the meaning of the principle at issue, and the
bounds beyond which that principle will not extend. The right may not
cover certain regions of the public sphere described by other fundamental
rights. By expressly and persuasively articulating the value content of
the right in this way, the judiciary exercises its characteristic discursive
competency, namely, principled discourse. In contrast, by defining the
free exercise clause solely in terms of its effects upon the social order,
Justice Scalia empties that text of any content except that which the majority's will gives it.148 According to Scalia, in the area of the individual's exercise of religion, the state's police power subordinates
constitutional principle.
Once it becomes clear that the Constitution does not protect religious practices from an indirect legislative prohibition that is "neutral
and uniform in its application," the question becomes, what then does the
free exercise clause protect? According to Scalia, the answer is readily
discernible, but difficult to fathom. If other first amendment norms constrain the majority's interference with (unfamiliar or unpopular) ideas or
beliefs, and religion entails no more than merely holding a belief, this
suggests that protecting the "free exercise" of religion is superfluous. On
this analysis, it is hardly surprising that Scalia insists the free exercise
clause must be "connected" to some other first amendment right in order
effectively to oppose majoritarian domination. In short, if the practice of
146 Cf Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1613 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In my view, however, the First
Amendment was enacted precisely to protect the rights of those whose religious practices are not
shared by the majority and may be viewed with hostility. The history of our free exercise doctrine
amply demonstrates the harsh impact majoritarian rule has had on unpopular or emerging religious
groups such as Jehovah's Witnesses and the Amish."); see also McConnell, supra note 117.
147 Cf Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Although the Court suggests that
the compelling interest test, as applied to generally applicable laws, would result in a 'constitutional
anomaly,'.., the First Amendment unequivocally makes freedom of religion like freedom from race
discrimination and free of speech, a 'constitutional nor[m],' not an 'anomaly'.").
148 Simply alluding to the past win/loss record of plaintiffs before the Court provides no more
principled basis for the majority's conclusion than defining away the free exercise clause's value. See
Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1610 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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religion was once believed to be a constitutional right immune to ordinary politics, 14 9 on Scalia's analysis that right now seems to have become
vestigial, or at most a "luxury."' 150 As Scalia says, in a society as religiously diverse as ours, for the courts to assess every religious objector's
claim of right in terms of countervailing government interests "of the
highest order" would be "courting anarchy."''
On the heels of this fear
(of social disorder), Scalia's deconstitutionalization of the free exercise
right opens the way to the supremacy of majority rule.
Scalia concedes that the Court's deference to the political bargaining
process "will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices
that are not widely engaged in."152 However, he "rationalizes" this risk
of majoritarian dominance by asserting that it is simply an "unavoidable
consequence of democratic government."' 153 The reasons why we should
accept this pronouncement are not forthcoming. In fact, the exact opposite of Scalia's axiomatic claim may be more persuasive. That is, accepting that the right to exercise one's religion as one sees fit embodies a
basic shared norm regarding the acceptable powers of government, it
may follow that this constraint upon the state may lead to multiple, independent, and conflicting normative worlds. 154 While the late Professor
Robert Cover may have admired such a proliferation of communities,
others are less sanguine about its anarchical implications. 55 Yet, it may
be said that it is precisely this risk of anarchy-favoring the individual's
privacy and freedom over the state's police power-that represents an
"unavoidable consequence of democratic government." It is not the danger of the state's losing control over the social order that is of greatest
constitutional concern, but rather its gaining control over individual beliefs and associations.
Whichever judicial interpretation obtains, however, the institutional
competency of judicial review requires that it be persuasively defended. 156 Unfortunately, Scalia's selective de-elevation of a particular
higher law principle (such as free exercise, but not other first amendment
rights) to the realm of pluralist bargaining within the ordinary political
149 See McConnell, supra note 117.
150 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1605.
151 Id.
152 Id. at 1606.
153 Id.
154 See Cover, Nomos, supra note 14.
155 See Kahn, Community in ContemporaryConstitutionalTheory, 99 YALE L.J. 1, 62-63 (1989);
Sherwin, supra note 7.
156 The availability of an equal protection argument, triggering heightened judicial scrutiny, may
also warrant consideration. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 472 n. 24
(1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("By invoking heightened scrutiny,
the Court recognizes, and compels lower courts to recognize, that a group may well be the target of
the sort of prejudiced, thoughtless, or stereotyped action that offends principles of equality found in
the Fourteenth Amendment.... The political powerlessness of a group may be relevant.....").
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process lacks adequate explanation and justification in principle.15 7 And
in this respect, the inadequacy of Ely's Carolene Products-based,"equal
access" jurisprudence becomes clear.158 Equal access to the political bargaining process cannot ensure that constitutional limits upon govern1 59
mental power will be maintained.
If anarchy properly names the underlying fear that motivates the
majority decision in Smith, the anxieties and passions that attend the
federal government's highly publicized war on drugs name the forces to
which the Court has surrendered. 160 And if institutional abdication of
principled judicial review names the majority's central discursive dysfunction, these forces take on a significant, perhaps even dominant (albeit
silent) role in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion. Here a different
discursive dysftmction comes to the fore: namely, the court's institutional incompetence at "balancing."
157 Cf.Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1612 (O'Connor, J., concurring):
The Court today gives no convincing reason to depart from settled First Amendment jurisprudence. There is nothing talismanic about neutral laws of general applicability or general criminal prohibition, for laws neutral toward religion can coerce a person to violate his religious
conscience or intrude upon his religious duties just as effectively as laws aimed at religion.
158 Indeed, the lesson should have been clear from Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1895)
(where the Court interpretedthe fourteenth amendment as ensuring equality of the races before the
law, but left the content of the law to majority rule-thus retreating from unitary constitutional
principle to localized customary practices: "Laws permitting, and even requiring, [racial] separation
in places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of
either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power."). But see id. at 560 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting):
The present decision... will encourage the belief that it is possible, by means of state enactments, to defeat the beneficent purposes which the people of the United States had in view when
they adopted the recent amendments of the Constitution, by one of which the blacks of this
country were made citizens of the United States and of the States in which they respectively
reside, and whose privileges and immunities as citizens, the States are forbidden to abridge.
See also Ayers v. Allain, 893 F.2d 732, 746 (5th Cir. 1990):
The Plessy Court abandoned its constitutional duty to influence the folkways of the South to
comport with the mores now enshrined in the fourteenth amendment; mores irreconcilable with
the separate but equal rule announced by the Court. This rule reinforced the social stigmatization of blacks with racial separation by force of law. Stereotypes of racial inferiority were perpetuated by galvanizing instead of transforming the perception that whites are superior. The
Court stated that it was the perceptions of blacks that created any badges of inferiority, when in
fact it was Mr. Plessy who was imploring the Court to bridle the racial beliefs of the white
majority that he so painfully endured.... Plessy is thus a decision that maintains the status quo
of a prejudiced society. The Court failed to begin to bring these perceptions in line with the
message that blacks were equal to whites. The constitutional rights of the minority did not
animate the Court's analysis.
159 Cf. Ackerman, supra note 37.
160 See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1620-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf Minersville School Dist. v.
Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (where Frankfurter elevates "national security" to a position that is
"inferior to none" in the hierarchy of legal values and asserts that "national unity is the basis of
national security."). Whereas Frankfurter was writing at the outset of World War II, Scalia writes
in the midst of a different "war," namely, the war on drugs. See also Wisotsky, supranote 10, at 890.
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2. Justice O'Connor's Concurring Opinion: The Discursive Dysfunction of Unexplained and Unjustified "Balancing."--In her concurring opinion, 161 Justice O'Connor argues that the majority "dramatically
departs from well-settled First Amendment jurisprudence."'' 62 At the
outset, she rejects the idea, repudiated in cases far more current than
Reynolds, that one can meaningfully split off religious belief from religious practice. For example, she states that: "[b]ecause the First Amendment does not distinguish between religious belief and religious conduct,
conduct motivated by sincere religious belief, like the belief itself, must
therefore be at least presumptively protected by the Free Exercise
Clause."' 63 O'Connor also notes that, contrary to Justice Scalia's majority opinion, the free exercise clause "does not distinguish between laws
that are generally applicable and laws that target particular religious
practices." 64
In this way, Justice O'Connor re-establishes the link between Smith
and recent Supreme Court decisions holding that generally applicable
laws that significantly (albeit indirectly) burden a religious practice require strict judicial scrutiny. According to O'Connor, "religious liberty
is an independent liberty" and as such it occupies "a preferred position."' 165 This is far from the superfluous role assigned to it in the majority's analysis. The key question becomes whether the state can justify, by
a "compelling state interest" and by "means narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest," the burden it has imposed upon Smith's religious conduct. 16 6 Put differently, the crucial question is whether Oregon's incidental prohibition of Smith's religious use of peyote
is "essential to
1 67
accomplish an overriding governmental interest?"
According to O'Connor, this question requires a case-by-case analysis "sensitive to the facts of each particular claim."' 6 Notwithstanding
this requirement, however, out of the ten pages of her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor takes just two paragraphs to arrive at the conclusion to which her balancing leads. That conclusion holds that the burden
upon Smith's exercise of religion is "essential" to accomplish the state's
"overriding interest" in preventing physical harm to its citizens and in
161 Which was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun as to Parts I and II (addressing the constitutional interpretation of the free exercise clause as applied to the Smith case, but not
as to the subsequent balancing of that right against the state's interest in drug control).
162 Smith, 110 S.Ct. at 1606.
163 Id. at 1608 ("Belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments.") (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)).
164 Id.
165 ia at 1609 (quoting Yoder).
166 Id. at 1608.
167 Id. at 1611 (citing Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304).
168 Id. ("[VW]e cannot assume, merely because a law carries criminal sanctions and is generally
applicable, that the First Amendment never requires the State to grant a limited exemption for relig-

iously motivated conduct.").
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preventing trafficking in controlled substances. 169 The reasons justifying
and explaining this conclusion, however, are not forthcoming. For example, O'Connor cites no facts to suggest that a limited quantity of peyote, used in a carefully constrained religious ceremony, actually
presents a health risk to the religious observer. 170 Moreover, while
preventing drug trafficking may be a worthy social goal, she cites no171evidence to link the religious use of peyote to trading in illicit drugs.
The impression this acontextual policy analysis leaves is that Justice
O'Connor simply does not wish to go against the current national tide, or
risk sending a message of "softness" on drugs. 172 The Court's "symbolic" gesture in this case may be consistent with an instrumentalist concern with maximizing the efficiency of a preferred policy goal (i.e.,
controlling the illegal drug trade). But it remains fundamentally inconsistent with the Court's institutional obligation to do justice in each case
individual plaintiffs to send
that comes before it. The courts may not use
17 3
deterrence-reinforcing messages to others.
I submit that O'Connor's balancing in this particular case points up
a discursive dysfunction that generally attends the Court's use of this
type of rhetoric.17 4 Balancing represents an institutional incompetency
for the judiciary because it typically fails to provide persuasive reasons
for the court's outcome. 175 This omission is crucial, given that principled persuasion provides the key to the judiciary's legitimate
169 Id. at 1614.
170 Id. at 1618 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (discussing lack of facts regarding peyote's health risk
and the Native American Church's careful limitations on peyote use). Note also that the Church's
endorsement of "morality" and "sobriety" suggests a general abhorrence of nonreligious use of
mind-altering substances. See E. ANDERSON, supra note 111.
171 As the dissent points out, there is "practically no illegal traffic in peyote." Smith, 110 S. Ct. at
1620 (citing statistics including: Drug Enforcement Agency's seizure of 19.4 pounds of peyote for
the period 1980-87 compared to 15 million pounds of marijuana seized during the same period).
172 See id. at 1616 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("One hopes that the Court is aware of the consequences, and that its result is not a product of overreaction to the serious problems the country's
drug crisis has generated.").
173 Cf. Sulie v. Duckworth, 689 F.2d 128, 130 (1982) (Posner, J.) (assessing defendant's right
against compelled self-incrimination in terms of the effect of its violation upon future exercise). Contra id. at 131, 132 (Cudahy, J., dissenting) ("[A]n analysis based on balancing deterrence of the
constitutional right to counsel against the state's interest in testimony about seeking a lawyer is an
approach clearly foreclosed to us by the Supreme Court.... The relevant question is whether the
particular defendant has been harmed ... not ... for persons generally.").
174 See generally Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age of Balancing,96 YALE L.J. 943, 1005
(1987):
Balancing was a liberating methodology at the outset. It took blinders offjudges' eyes and let
them openly take into account the connections between constitutional law and the real world.
Preaching a pragmatic, realistic approach to constitutional law, it promised doctrine arrived at
objectively and grounded in the facts of the society to which it applied. But balancing, whatever
it merits as a way out of formalism, has itself become rigid and formulaic. It gives answers, but
falls to persuade.
175 Id. at 983 ("No conviction, no belief in the justness of the result informs the opinion. Balancing has become mechanical jurisprudence. It has lost its ability to persuade.").

430
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authority. 176

It may be said that the balancing style reflects the dominance of the
177
Legal Realist's instrumental approach to judicial decisionmaking,
which identifies preferable policy goals and seeks to ensure that those
goals are maintained. 178 Axiomatic assertions based on "self-evident"
(which is to say, unexplained and unjustified) preferences, typify that effort. The balancing approach tends to level principled discourse to the
ordinary political plane of interest accommodation. But as we have
previously noted, while the apodictic style may characterize the citizen's
ordinary common sense, or the legislator's pragmatic, interest-accommodation skills, it does not comport with the judge's unique institutional
obligations. 179 Thus Justice O'Connor's use of a legislative style of decisionmaking, like Justice Scalia's abrogation of principled judicial review
in favor of deference to the political process, also undercuts the legitimacy of the Court's authority. For whether the Court engages in rhetorical distortions at the initial stage of identifying and interpreting an
applicable text-based principle, or later on, in the stage of contextual application, the result is the same. The Court's exercise of unauthorized
power provides a public warrant to challenge its authority. This conclusion may be expressed in the following general terms: When a particular
institutional discourse, suited to one branch but ill suited to another, is
taken beyond its proper bounds, one should not be surprised to witness
the legitimation crisis that follows.
In Justice O'Connor's "balancing," the state's incidental prohibition
of Smith's religion is deemed to be essential. But does this naked assertion inspire belief in the justness of the result reached? 180 The answer
may come down to this: Would you forsake your religious liberty, or a
similarly fundamental right, for the type of abstract social policy reasons
176 Cf. Kahn, supra note 41, at 59 ("[U]litimately, a Court dedicated to constitutional adjudication cannot exercise power unjustified by principle.").
177 See Aleinikoff, supra note 174, at 955-63. Averting any trace of "mysticism" in the law may
have been taken a step too far by the Realists. That is, their quest for objectivity amidst facts and
social conditions cast a shadow over values or principles that oftentimes operate in the law independent of policy interests.
178 See Kahn, supra note 41, at 5:
Balancing cannot provide an adequate foundation for judicial review because the Court must
explain and justify its results. Articulate argument, not silent intuition is the only source of
legitimacy for judicial review. Without such an explanation at the heart of the judicial decision,
the court is open to the charge that it usurps the functions of the political institutions of

government.
179 See Alienikoff, supra note 174, at 991:
Constitutional law provides a set of peremptory norms-a checking power-that is basic to the
American notion of a government of limited powers.... Balancing undermines the checking
and validating functions of constitutional law. This is most apparent in opinions that adopt a
legislative voice, openly weighing costs and benefits in order to maximize social welfare.
180 Cf id. at 972-76 ("A frequent criticism of balancing is that the court has no objective criteria
for valuing or comparing the interests at stake.").
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that Justice O'Connor identifies here?18 1 This basic query goes to the
heart of the distinction between higher law principles (regarding the basic powers and limitations of government) and ordinary political bargaining (through which local interests are accommodated and preferred
policies are legislatively enacted).
In Smith, only the dissenters manage expressly to address not only
the plaintiff's substantive right to practice his religion without unwarranted governmental interference, but also significant facts that Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion silently passes over. Regarding the former, the dissenters' principled interpretive discourse concerning the textual meaning and contextual reach of the free exercise clause puts Justice
O'Connor's balancing act to the test. It specifically invites an explicit
explanation of why the principle that lies at the heart of this case should
be limited in its normative force. According to the dissenters, without
persuasive reasons explaining and justifying why the state's policy interests should limit the plaintiff's free exercise of religion, that freedom
should prevail. Yet, as we have seen, Justice O'Connor provides no persuasive, factually based grounds for her conclusion. Indeed, the dissenters' factual refutation of O'Connor's reliance upon the state's general
interest in preserving the health of its citizens and in curtailing the illicit
drug trade remains unanswered by her opinion. Those facts indicate that
there is no serious illicit trading in peyote and that no harmful effect has
been shown regarding the health of those individuals who consume small
amounts of peyote in the course of the Native American Church's ceremonially and spiritually disciplined religious service. 182
181 Or, conversely, would you be willing personally to coerce a person like Smith to give up his
religious beliefs and practices on these grounds? Cf. Cover, Bonds, supra note 14, at 822-25 (describing federal district court judge's refusal to sentence a defendant where he could not be sure that the
West German penal system would extend proper constitutional guarantees). For Cover, this refusal
portrays the close connection between the word of judicial interpretation and the deed of
enforcement.
182 Blackmun's dissent, which was joined by Brennan and Marshall, starts by placing the Smith
case in the line of free exercise cases that the Court has considered in this century. Smith, 110 S. Ct.
at 1616. By locating the issues and principles involved in a historical stream, the dissent conforms to
the ideal of the Court as an interpreter of tradition and principle, not policy. This reflects a judicial
discourse as opposed to a legislative one.
The bulk of the dissent is taken up by an analysis of the specific facts of the Smith case as seen in
the light of the principles articulated from the history of free exercise cases. Again, citing both
academic and case authority, Blackmun first articulates the principles that determine the state interest and the criteria for that interest. Id at 1617. He measures the claimed state interests against
those principles and against the uncontroverted reality concerning the specifics of peyote use. Id. at
1618-21.
Besides integrating factual and historical principle, another noteworthy rhetorical feature of the
dissent is the respect the discussion extends to both the state's and the citizens' claims. Each party's
argument is articulated and measured against historical principle and the responding argument of
the other. It is only after this is done that a judgment is annonced. The participants are involved in
the process of judicial decisionmaking by this rhetorical strategy. Even claims that are defeated are
respected. The opinion in this regard is inclusive, not exclusive. This inclusionary aspect is reiterated
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By adhering to the institutional constraints of principled judicial discourse, the dissenters in Smith show respect for the structural constitutional norms of rhetorical pluralism. Unlike the majority, they resist the
temptation to emulate the "apodictic" (self-evident) and "performative"
(rule-like) rhetoric of legislators. As a result, instead of conflating judicial and legislative competencies, the dissenters would effectively check
majoritarian policy preferences that unjustifiably trench upon expressly
interpreted and contextually applied constitutional values. Thus, the dissenters uphold both intra-judicial discursive competencies and inter-institutional checks and balances. In substantive terms, the dissenters'
unwillingness to sacrifice principle (in defense of a pagan religious practice) to majoritarian interests in crime control (for the sake of deterring
harmful and illicit drug use or marketing-at least in other cases, if not in
the Smith case itself) also reflects the dissenters' adherence to basic liberal values.
Ordinarily, a democratic republic that is secure in its national identity, and confident of its basic principles, should not feel the need to violate its commitment to individual autonomy, social standing and group
based identity for the sake of public order alone. But these may not be
ordinary times. Today, fear and uncertainty becloud our sense of national identity and distort the intra-institutional discursive competencies
and inter-institutional checks and balances necessary to ensure the continued legitimation of state power.
It is at this point, then, that we turn to the next stage of our analysis
of the Court's decision in Smith. Here we will ask: How might the discourse ideal help to inform and guide our understanding of the substantive norms that are at issue in this case?
B.

Substantive Norms and the Discourse Ideal

1. The Legal Dimension of Legitimation.-I have argued that the
theory and practice of rhetorical pluralism and the discourse ideal provide an integrated account of the three matters concerning which liberalism must provide an acceptable understanding: human nature, the
institutionalization of power, and shared basic ideals. So far, as a matter
of structural constitutional construction, I have sought to show that the
Smith majority operates in a discursively dysfunctional fashion. Rather
than maintain the Constitution's pluralist view of human nature, the
Smith majority substitutes a different vision. Under the view expressed
by Justice Scalia, the ordinary judicial virtue of principled discourse collapses into the ordinary legislative virtue of pluralist bargaining in the
political process. As a result, majority rule subordinates interpretively
in its penultimate section, id at 1621-22, in which Blackmun places special emphasis on the minority
nature of the citizens' claims.
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persuasive and contextually applied principle.1 8 3 At the same time, popular passions and the legislative clamor for law and order attendant upon

the nation's declared "war on drugs" increasingly overcome the ordinary
virtues of both legislative policymaking and constitutional principle.
I turn now to the third matter concerning which liberalism must
provide a persuasive account, namely, the matter of shared public values.

This shifts our focus from structural constitutional norms, which guide
institutional competencies, to the substantive norms that make up the
liberal discourse ideal.
In the face-off between state coercion and individual liberty, much
depends upon whether the choices made and the actions undertaken in
18 4
the public sphere are based on what we fear or what we cherish most.
If Justice Scalia's chief concern in Smith rests with the former (Le., his
fear of social disorder in the face of the individual's religious conscience),
a central concern of the discourse ideal lies with the latter (i.e., the normative force of fundamental beliefs that must coexist within a shared
public community). Consider, first, the discourse ideal's requirement of
respecting individual dignity in the context of the Smith case.
Subjecting a right to majority rule-Le., to the usages, customs, and
traditions of local communities' 1 5-places it in the grip of fluctuating
popular preferences and interests. This is inconsistent with a conception
183 The Court's message in Smith--of cultural dominance over practitioners of "pagan" faiths
like the Native American Church-remains implicit, and perhaps even unwitting. Cf State v. Big
Sheep, 243 P. 1067, 1072 (1926) ("It was clearly within the power of the Legislature to determine
whether the practice of using peyote is consistent with good order, peace, and safety of the state. We
do not find peyote or any like herb mentioned by Isaiah, or by Saint Paul in his epistle to the
Romans, nor does it seem from the language employed that Saint John the Divine had any such in
mind."). Contra People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 721, 394 P.2d 813, 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74,
(1964) (where the State Attorney General argued that since "peyote could be regarded as a symbol,
one that obstructs enlightenment and shackles the Indian to primitive conditions, the responsibility
rests with the state to eliminate its use." This argument was rejected by the court: "We know of no
doctrine that the state, in its asserted omniscience, should undertake to deny to defendants the observance of their religion in order to free them from the suppositious 'shackles' of their 'unenlightened'
and 'primitive conditions.' ").
184 Compare Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (Frankfurter, J.):
[T]he question remains whether school children, like the Gobitis children, must be excused
from conduct required of all the other children in the promotion of national cohesion. We are
dealing with an interest inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values. National unity is the
basis of national security.
with Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634-642 (Jackson, J.):
mThe asserted power to force an American citizen publicly to profess any statement or belief or
to engage in any ceremony of assent to one, presents questions of power that must be considered
independently of any idea we may have as to the utility of the ceremony in question ...
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.... If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion or
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.
185 Cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1895) ("In determining the question of reasonableness [of a statute which segregated the use of public conveniences based on race, the state] is at
liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the people ....
).
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of enduring values constituting the supreme law of the land.1 6 Yet, it is
to interest-based politics that Justice
this sacrifice of basic principles
187

Scalia carries out in Smith.
Under Justice Scalia's view, so long as Oregon's applicable criminal

law is neutral on its face and makes no direct reference to religion, its

incidental affect upon a religion will not prompt constitutional concern.
This view, however, presupposes a sense of "neutrality" that is based on
a majoritarian perspective. To many people, perhaps even a majority,
the law in question may seem neutral, but from the perspective of Smith
it is anything but that. Indeed, its enforcement effectively outlaws his
religion.1 81 By failing to take into account Smith's perspective, and by
subjecting his deeply held beliefs to the will of the majority, the Court
violates his dignity and autonomy.18 9 It is as if his view did not count.
And it is this indifference that leads the Court to ignore the second requirement of the discourse ideal.
The Court's majoritarian perspective reflects a failure to listen to,
and empathize with, the story Smith has to tell. Understanding his claim

requires that conventional or subjective presuppositions be suspended in
order that the claimant's own idea of self and community and the beliefs
that are essential to it, can be heard. 190 Without this, discourse cannot
meaningfully proceed. Judgment, absent inter-subjective understanding,
is coercive. It reaches no one except the already persuaded, for whom no
persuasion is needed. If this were a matter for self-operative rules, the
186 See A. BICKEL, supra note 43 (on the role of judicial review in discerning and upholding
enduring values); cf Plessy, 163 U.S. at 561-62 (Harlan, J., dissenting):
State enactments, regulating the enjoyment of civil rights, upon the basis of race, and cunningly
devised to defeat the legitimate results of the [civil] war, under the pretence of recognizing
equality of rights, can have no other result than to render permanent peace impossible, and to
keep alive a conffict of races, the continuance of which must do harm to all concerned.
187 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1606.
188 See McConnell, supra note 117, at 1419.
189 See Wallace v. Jaifree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-53 (1985):
[T]he Court has unambiguously concluded that the individual freedom of conscience protected
by the First Amendment embraces the right to select any religious faith or none at all. This
conclusion derives support not only from the interest in respecting the individual's freedom of
conscience, but also from the conviction that religious beliefs worthy of respect are the product
of free and voluntary choice by the faithful.
But see M. SANDEL, supra note 6, at 609-10 ("ITihe image of the unencumbered self, despite its
appeal, is inadequate to the liberty it promises. In the case of religion, the liberal conception of the
person ill equips the Court to secure religious liberty for those who regard themselves as claimed by
religious commitments they have not chosen.") (emphasis added).
190 Cf. C. GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 59 (1983) ("Rather than attempting to place the experience of others within the [western] framework... understanding them demands setting that conception aside and seeing their experience within the framework of their own idea of what selfhood is.");
see also R. WINDES & A. HASTINGS, ARGUMENTATION AND ADVOCACY 22-23 (1966):
Rational decision-making emphasizes the fact that wise decisions ordinarily require time and
patience,time to investigate problems thoroughly, the time to analyze alternatives carefully, and
the time to prepare cogent arguments for and against each; the patience to listen to opposing
points of view, the patience to suspend judgment until all pertinent arguments have been heard.
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performative style may suffice. But principled judicial discourse must
proceed differently. In Smith, it does not.
This is not to say that the claimant's perspective, once heard, must
prevail over the state's. What it does mean is that the plaintiff's claim of
right must be persuasively assessed in the context of the state's countervailing interests. This calls into play the third requirement of the discourse ideal: a commitment to keep in play the discursive process of give
and take. This commitment requires persuasive reasoning. For example,
it may be reasonably argued that there are circumstances under which
the freedom of religion may be limited. The existence of a clear and
present danger to others, 191 or the need to protect society as a whole
from grave and pressingly imminent harms, 192 or the obligation to maintain basic services 193 are illustrative.
The question thus becomes: Is there good reason to conclude that
the social order will survive, without significant detriment to basic values, if the Court creates an exemption from the obligation to follow an
applicable law because of an individual's religious conscience? In this
respect, the discourse ideal's commitment to reasoned "give and take"
between opposing parties may parallel the high Court's requirement that
the state justify imposing a burden on a plaintiff's religious beliefs by
persuasively showing that it is "essential" to accomplish an "overriding
governmental interest."' 194 In short, the force of the state's countervailing interest must be carefully assessed in light of the specific facts of
the case in question as well as the history and depth of commitment to
the principle that is being challenged.
Absent facts on the record expressly showing the tangible harms or
dangers that would flow from the requested exemption, the claimant's
freedom of religion should prevail. As we have seen, however, in Smith
the State expressed no more than a general interest in fighting drug trafficking and protecting the health of its citizens.195 But the State's "war
191 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 634.
192 Id. at 643-44.
193 See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (disallowing religious exemption for Amish
citizens who refuse to pay taxes that fund social security benefits is not an impermissible free exercise
burden because those benefits represent an essential social interest and uniform participation is important for tax system to function); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (governmental
purpose of protecting children from burdensome and exploitative labor carries greater value to society than parental religious claim); see also Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598
(1968) (affirming a district court finding that a statute permitting the administration of blood transfusions to children over parents' objection was constitutional).
194 Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58.
195 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1617-18 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the record shows that
trafficking in peyote is not a serious social problem and that there is no empirical data to support the
assertion that a limited quantity of peyote, ingested under the carefully controlled circumstances of
the Native American Church's religious ceremony, represents a health hazard); see also People v.
Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 722-23, 394 P.2d 813, 819, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1964):
The record, however, does not support the state's chronicle of harmful consequences of the use
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on drugs" cannot persuasively justify or explain the prohibition of
Smith's sincere religious practice in this particular case. 196 Justice
Scalia's fear that granting Smith's claim will open a floodgate' 97 similarly
lacks any firm empirical grounding. 198 As another court has aptly stated:
"Justifications founded only on fear and apprehension are insufficient to
overcome rights asserted under the First Amendment."' 199

In sum, unlike the dissenters, the majority in Smith ignores each of
the substantive requirements essential to the liberal discourse ideal,
namely: respect for the other, empathy for the story she has to tell, and a
commitment to provide intelligible justifications that are or can be made
acceptable in principle to every member of society. The difficult questions that the Court's failure in Smith raises are the following: What
consequences ensue if the liberal framework of shared normative principles, including the plaintiff's right to be heard, and his claim to social
belongingness, are no longer being observed by the Court? What if the
value of his liberty under these circumstances cannot remain on par with
the liberty of other members of the polity? These questions take us from
the legal to the political dimension of legitimation in the context of the
Smith case.
2. The PoliticalDimension of Legitimation.-To the extent that an
individual or a group of individuals experience (or reasonably anticipate)
of peyote. The evidence indicates that the Indians do not in fact employ peyote in place of
proper medical care; and, as the Attorney General with fair objectivity admits, 'there was no
evidence to suggest that Indians who use peyote are more liable to become addicted to other
narcotics than non-peyote-using Indians.'... Finally, as the Attorney General likewise admits,
the opinion of scientists and other experts is 'that peyote... works no permanent deleterious
injury to the Indian....' Indeed, as we have noted, these experts regard the moral standards of
members of the Native American Church as higher than those of Indians outside the church.
See also Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Admin., 878 F.2d 1458, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Frank v. State,
604 P.2d 1068, 1074 (Alaska 1979).
196 Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1617. Indeed, Smith's ceremonial practice might actually advance policy
interests underlying drug control. For example, the founding Charter of the Native American
Church explicitly states that the Church seeks to promote "morality" and "sobriety."
197 Id. at 1605 ("Any society adopting such a system [of granting exemptions where no compelling interest exists to counter it] would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct
proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress
none of them.").
198 Cf. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d at 723, 394 P.2d. at 818, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 74 (" 'ITihere is no proof
whatever to warrant such fears of malingering or deceit as those which the respondents now advance.' ") (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963)). That the courts have not been
hampered by a "proliferation" of religious exemption claims is fairly evident. That they have not had
difficulty in handling the cases that have come before them is also manifest. See, ag., Olsen, 878
F.2d at 1462-64 (where the court articulates, on empirical and well reasoned grounds, the tangible
social harms that would flow from exempting marijuana use from legal constraint on religious
grounds); Town v. State ex rel Reno, 377 So. 2d 648, 651 (Fla. 1979) (same); see also Leary v. United
States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967) (affirming jury instruction that acquittal was appropriate if jury
found that defendant's marijuana use was part of sincere religious belief), rev'd on other grounds, 395
U.S. 6 (1969).
199 Frank, 604 P.2d at 1074.
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the destruction of a sense of self identity, or of a shared normative reality
among others, the warrant necessary to reject the authority of the state
may be at hand. In the context of the Smith case, then, the question
becomes: Why should someone in Smith's position submit to the rule of
law as embodied in the Court's decision, given that the rhetoric of that
ruling and its practical effect might well threaten the very existence of his
sense of self and community? If Smith, and others similarly affected by
the Court's ruling, are thrust beyond the margins of society, what stake
in public life is left to them? Are the conditions of conventional social life
sufficient to allow for the flourishing of Smith's sense of self? If the answer is no, how can he reasonably be expected to submit to his own demise? Indeed, what is the basis for freedom of choice absent a coherent
sense of self and normative reality? If this is the case, what distinguishes
the state's coercive prohibition of Smith's religious worship from the exercise of naked violence? And why shouldn't the state's violence against
Smith and his community warrant a response in kind?
Now it may be that Smith's commitment to the principle of freedom
of religion, or to the demands of his religious scruples, is not strong
enough to lead him personally to risk direct confrontation with the police
power of the state (e.g., by engaging in acts of civil disobedience). He
may, therefore, simply acquiesce to the law's prohibition. 20 0 On the
other hand, he may also proceed against the state in a fashion that does
not force him to "put his body on the line." For example, he could seek
a favorable court ruling on state constitutional grounds. 20 1 Or he could
lobby state legislators and speak out publicly to voters concerning the
injustice of the state's action.
But what if these efforts were to fail?
Tony Honore provides, in my view, the correct response: "In the
end, the only guarantee of human dignity is that we would, if pressed too
far, be prepared to rebel, and, if we did so, would have the right on our
side. It would then be the duty of other members of our community to
support us."' 20

2

If the other is deemed by a majority to have strayed

beyond society's bounds, may we then act against her without constitutional constraint?20 3 And what of the political requirements of legitima200 It should be noted that mere acquiescence does not offer a source of legitimacy to the state's
exercise of power. See Sherwin, supra note 100, at 404-06 & n.83 (on dejure v. defacto authority and

the fall of the Marcos regime).
201 Oregon's Supreme Court expressly avoided this ground, preferring instead to interpret the
first amendment of the federal Constitution. See Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States, 61

N.Y.U. L. REv. 535, 546-53 (1986) (on state constitutional defenses of basic rights in the face their
federal deconstitutionalization); Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental
Rights, 35 RUTGERs L. REV. 707 (1983).
202 See Honore, supra note 4, at 54.
203 Cf. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056, 1060 (1990) (limiting the reach of the

fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures to "the people" of the
United States). According to Justice Rehnquist, "'the people' protected by the Fourth Amendment
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tion? Our answer to these questions may depend upon our vision of
America: does it allow us to turn someone like Smith into a legal and

political exile?
The response that we offer, in silence or otherwise, is perhaps the
most important part of the stories we tell about law and power, and

about ourselves and our community. These are stories of legitimation.
They constitute the poetics of law. The account offered here of rhetorical
pluralism and the discourse ideal is one such story, awaiting response.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The ultimate security of the social order depends upon more than
the use of the state's police power. Of even greater importance is a broad
and active commitment, by officials and citizens alike, to shared basic
principles of government. This normative commitment should be capable of making the use of force acceptable (in principle) to every member
of society. Confusion about the basic values that constrain and empower
the state not only tends to erode the social order, it also tends to distort
institutional practices. If left uncorrected, these distortions increasingly
threaten the legitimacy of state authority.
Current uncertainties about the meaning and value of liberalism,
taken together with potent fears and uncertainties surrounding our national sense of identity and direction, have allowed serious institutional
distortions to go unchecked. The approach of rhetorical pluralism and
the discourse ideal seeks to counter this trend. It attempts to do so by
providing a revitalized understanding of basic liberal ideals and by articulating the standards for intra-institutional competencies and inter-institutional checks and balances that those ideals generate in the context of
our constitutional democracy.
Absent broad and active acceptance of the basic principles of government, the power to rule may exist, but the right to rule may not. The
legal dimension of the legitimation of state power involves the structural
and substantive norms that make up our constitutional framework. The
political dimension goes to the individual's or group's commitment to a
way of life-independent of what others, including officials, may say
about what the constitutional framework permits or prohibits.2 04 The
... refers to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community." Id. at 1061
(Rehnquist, C.J., majority opinion).
204 See, eg., Cover, Nomos, supra note 14, at 28-29:
In this realm of meaning-if not in the domain of social control-the Mennonite community

creates law as fully as does the judge. First, the Mennonites inhabit an ongoing nomos that must

be marked off by a normative boundary from the realm of civil coercion, just as the wielders of
state power must establish their boundary with a religious community's resistance and autonomy.... The Mennonites are not simply advocates, for they are prepared to live and do live by
their proclaimed understanding of the Constitution.
See also id. at 32 ('Freedom of association implies a degree of norm-generating autonomy on the
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politics of legitimation cannot be separated from constitutionalism. Indeed, political legitimation remains an essential prerequisite to constitutional legitimacy. It describes the circumstances under which a
particular constitutional reality is created and maintained, modified or
abandoned.
Since submission to the rule of law must be knowing and voluntary,
informed choice presupposes an autonomous chooser. That which
threatens the coherence of the chooser's self, or of the normative world in
which self-identity is to be found, threatens the very basis for a shared
public world. It is for this reason that the liberal discourse ideal carries
such persuasive force. For it acknowledges the ultimate supremacy of
popular sovereignty, and the need for state officials to participate in public debate with others concerning the basic norms of public life. This
discursive process is necessary to sustain the living pulse of normative
consensus.
Without this kind of broad discursive engagement, the normative
basis for a shared public community may be lost. Private normative
worlds may then proliferate, but the clash of beliefs that will inevitably
ensue will find no common place for peaceful resolution. Since public
indictments are inescapable in any social reality, it is incumbent upon the
community at large to ensure that the response of violence is carefully
contained. The need for the rule of law and a public arena in which
reasoned public articulation of indictment-activated values may proceed
must therefore be met. Legal discourse, guided by acceptable norms of
institutionalized power, may complement private norm-based self and
group identities. In any event, the relationship between the rule of law
and private identity remains reciprocal. When law operates to crush
identity, there is no reason to submit to the state's force.
Thus, when it comes to shared public values, an attitude of indifference, prejudice, or misunderstanding concerning the other's basic needs,
beliefs, or claims of right may place the state's legitimacy at risk. By
casting her out, the state may hand the political, social, or legal exile a
public warrant for resistance. The Supreme Court's opinion in Division
of Employment v. Smith, read in this light, becomes a parable of pagan
religious practices being subordinated to the ordinary (interest-accommodating) politics of majority rule. On this reading, Smith provides a
warning concerning the Court's disregard for the legal and political requirements of legitimation. The majority's unexplained and unjustified
de-elevation (to the realm of political bargaining) of the individual's right
freely to exercise his religion, and the concurring opinion's equally unexplained and unjustified "balancing" in favor of a preferred state interest
in the "war against drugs," again at the expense of the plaintiff's free
part of the association. It is not a liberty to be but a liberty and capacity to create and interpret lawminimally, to interpret the terms of the association's own being."); id. at 67 ("The statist impasse in
constitutional creation must soon come to an end.").
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exercise right, illustrate two separate discursive dysfunctions to which
the judiciary is prone. The contribution of each of these dysfunctions to
a legitimation crisis in the public sphere suggests the need for corrective
action.
When courts shirk their institutional responsibility to provide a
principled check upon the ordinary political process of pluralist bargaining (in which majority rule prevails), and legislatures subordinate their
characteristic institutional virtue (of deliberatively developing comprehensive policy goals) to a dysfunctional appetite for selfish political gain,
including deference to popular passions-or stoking them by targeting
"the enemy within," it falls upon the people to reassert their sovereign
power to rediscover and actuate within the public sphere the pulse of our
higher law.
The clash of conflicting principles thus comes to be seen as an inescapable part of our constitutional democracy, even if it means embracing
the possibility that, at times, active resistance to another's (including the
state's) normative commitment may be necessary. At the same time,
however, the divisiveness and strife of opposition, and the danger of domestic violence, should persuade us all to accept an unceasing commitment to seek out normative consensus.
Locating and protecting the proper bounds between private and
public worlds requires the rule of law. The rule of law in turn requires
broad and active commitment to a shared narrative of legitimation, such
as the account of rhetorical pluralism and the discourse ideal that this
Article provides. How else-and with what hope of success-is democratic government to mediate, in a world of discord, violence, and death,
the insistent demands of liberty, community, and social justice?

